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ID:
147593
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although jihadi nasheeds play an important role in the Islamic State's propaganda, there is scant literature on the topic. This article is an exploratory study on seventeen Islamic State nasheeds released between December 2013 and March 2015. The main argument is that Islamic State nasheeds are effective messaging tools because they focus on a limited number of themes that have broad appeal among Muslims. The nasheeds differ from other Islamic State propaganda in their almost exclusive focus on war and fighting, rather than on the softer sides of life in the Islamic State.
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| 2 |
ID:
190994
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| Summary/Abstract |
Few regions have been more plagued by terrorism than the Arab world. However, knowledge of the phenomenon’s nature is limited by a lack of attack plot data for most Arab countries. This article contributes to addressing this gap by presenting a dataset of jihadist incidents in Jordan from 1994 until the end of 2018. Based on recent progress in measuring terrorism, the dataset does not only include launched attacks but also foiled and failed attack plots to give a more accurate and comprehensive overview of the threat. It provides answers to fundamental descriptive questions such as how many plots there have been, which jihadist actors have been responsible, and what type of attacks they have attempted to carry out. This work matters because it reveals the main characteristics of the jihadist terrorist threat to the Kingdom. This enables future studies to provide more empirically based explanations of what causes jihadist terrorism in Jordan than previously possible.
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| 3 |
ID:
178981
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| Summary/Abstract |
How can vulnerable states adjacent to countries embroiled in civil war avoid conflict contagion? Jordan has all the classic attributes highlighted in the literature as creating vulnerabilities susceptible to spillover. It adjoins Syria and Iraq where jihadists have operated freely. It has a weak economy, refugees pouring in from adjacent conflicts and is home to hundreds—if not thousands—of jihadists. Moreover, jihadists consider the Jordanian regime to be traitors—who conspire with the enemies of Islam—and they want to replace it with an Islamic state. However, as we show, very few jihadist attacks have happened in Jordan. We test three hypotheses for the limited spillover. Our analysis suggests a state policy that we dub “calibrated repression” is the most significant explanation. This means that Jordan protects against spillover by repressing jihadist attempts at infiltrating the kingdom and clamping down on local terrorist cells linked to the Islamic State while keeping other domestic jihadist elements in check through co-optation. The regime restrains the use of force against less acute threats and displays some leniency towards radicals when the situation allows. Our findings speak to the broader literature on spillover and offer insights into the understudied topic of mechanisms limiting spillover in high-risk environments.
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| 4 |
ID:
188384
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article offers a review of the literature on Jordanian jihadism. While excellent work has been done, particularly on the phenomenon’s history and ideologues such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, several topics remain unexplored. The main explanation for the literature’s shortcomings is that it has been too inward-looking. I argue that this insularity has led to three problems: first, the literature sometimes recycles observations already made; second, it fails to show how Jordan presents specificities in terms of jihadism; and third and most importantly, it misses insights from the literature on political violence about radicalization and terrorist attack activity. As a result, it fails to address key questions about Jordanian jihadism, such as why, when, and how terrorist attacks happen.
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