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ID:
157296
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article empirically evaluates whether the adoption of market mechanisms such as auction, tender and quotation for land-use rights acquisition effectively reduces illegal land use in China. It is based on official statistics of (i) illegal land use cases and areas; and (ii) adoption rate of market-led transactions in 30 provinces from 1999 to 2008. A fixed effects panel model is used to control for factors like land revenue dependency, law enforcement, per capita gross domestic product, government size, real estate investment, relative wage in public sector and citizens’ level of education. The findings demonstrate that the market mechanism is effective in reducing illegal land use. However, the Chinese government needs to close legal and institutional loopholes in the land administration regime in order to improve the effectiveness of market-led transactions in reducing land corruption.
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| 2 |
ID:
147605
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| Summary/Abstract |
Based on an empirical fieldwork study in a central-south municipal city in China, this article discusses the contestation between land-lost farmers and local government in the process of urbanization and land expropriation, focusing on the land-lost farmers’ responses to this process. After a discussion of land-lost farmers’ reasons for discontent and their actions, it is argued that such a contestation is an interaction where land-lost farmers tend to lay claim to their legitimate morality while local government lays claim to its legitimate authority, through the institutional approach of an appeal system provided by the state. The truth is that not only do both sides of the contestation have to rely on the power conferred by the central state, but also they constitute an interdependent local network.
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| 3 |
ID:
172253
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes the grassroots governance in the rapid urbanization process on the rural-urban periphery of Changsha with regard to the relationship between land-lost farmers and the local government. Distinct from conventional wisdom that implies an interpretation of that relationship that is too dichotomous and static, the present study explores the relationship using the structure-agency dynamics model played out locally within a network of power-interests structure. In turn, the different strategies attached to both sides of the grassroots governance induce a contrasting power-interests structure, as displayed in three resettlement communities: fatalism and resignation, outright conflict, and resolution through local participation. It is notable that local governance emerges when farmers’ views and participation are incorporated, thus opening a public space for dialogue and farmers’ entrepreneurial activity.
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