| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
192181
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In 2018, China's general secretary, Xi Jinping, announced a three-year war on “black societies and evil forces” and promised to take down various forms of organized crime and evil forces within society. This article examines the operational features of this particular crackdown and how they diverged from previous “strike hard” campaigns. This campaign adopted novel strategies including embedding instructions on law enforcement within criminal justice institutions, promulgating special rules on the crimes of evil forces in order to “strike” campaign targets early, and deploying intrusive investigation tactics that focused on the person and not the crime. Using democratic centralism as a liberal lens, this campaign showcases the struggle between the imperative of legality and the politics of a major campaign in China.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
147605
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Based on an empirical fieldwork study in a central-south municipal city in China, this article discusses the contestation between land-lost farmers and local government in the process of urbanization and land expropriation, focusing on the land-lost farmers’ responses to this process. After a discussion of land-lost farmers’ reasons for discontent and their actions, it is argued that such a contestation is an interaction where land-lost farmers tend to lay claim to their legitimate morality while local government lays claim to its legitimate authority, through the institutional approach of an appeal system provided by the state. The truth is that not only do both sides of the contestation have to rely on the power conferred by the central state, but also they constitute an interdependent local network.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
172253
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes the grassroots governance in the rapid urbanization process on the rural-urban periphery of Changsha with regard to the relationship between land-lost farmers and the local government. Distinct from conventional wisdom that implies an interpretation of that relationship that is too dichotomous and static, the present study explores the relationship using the structure-agency dynamics model played out locally within a network of power-interests structure. In turn, the different strategies attached to both sides of the grassroots governance induce a contrasting power-interests structure, as displayed in three resettlement communities: fatalism and resignation, outright conflict, and resolution through local participation. It is notable that local governance emerges when farmers’ views and participation are incorporated, thus opening a public space for dialogue and farmers’ entrepreneurial activity.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|