| Summary/Abstract |
Very little is known about Pakistan's nuclear policy and, in particular, about its adoption of minimum deterrence, given the existence of nuclear ambiguity and the absence of public, official documentation of Pakistan's understanding of minimum deterrence. Therefore, despite its innocuousness, ‘minimum’ remains a vague and complex phenomenon short of definitional concreteness when it is brought to a real conceptual test. On the one hand, minimum is regarded as a small number of deterrent forces arguing against expansion and arms competition, while, on the other hand, it is viewed as a relative, and therefore continually evolving, concept depending on the region's fast-changing strategic environment. A conceptual basis for the concept of minimum is explored, leading to the question: why does Pakistan pursue minimum deterrence? It traces out the rationale of Pakistan's minimum deterrence as conceptualized following the 1998 nuclear tests. This rationale of Pakistan's minimum deterrence is then analysed in light of the essentials of minimum deterrence in order to see whether it is consistent with the basics of minimum as conceived here.
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