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ID: 148036

Civilianizing civil conflict: civilian defense militias and the logic of violence in intrastate conflict / Clayton, Govinda ; Thomson, Andrew

Clayton, Govinda	Journal Article
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This article examines how civilian defense militias shape violence during civil war. We define civilian defense forces as a sedentary and defensive form of pro-government militia that incumbents often use to harness the participation of civilians during a counterinsurgency campaign. We argue that civilian defense forces reduce the problem of insurgent identification. This leads to a reduction in state violence against civilians. However, we also claim that these actors undermine civilian support for insurgents, which leads to an increase in rebel violence against civilians and overall intensification of conflict. A statistical analysis of government and rebel violence against civilians from 1981 to 2005 and a qualitative assessment of a civilian defense force operating in Iraq from 2005 to 2009 offer strong support for our theoretical claims. These findings provide further insight into pro-government militias and their effects on violence. They also have wider ethical implications for the use of civilian collaborators during civil war.

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Intrastate Conflict ; Civilianizing Civil Conflict ; Civilian Defense Militias ; Logic of Violence

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ID: 167367

Control and Collaboration: simulating the logic of violence in civil war for political science students / Mosinger , Eric

Mosinger , Eric	Journal Article
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Civil War ; Logic of Violence

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ID: 174461

Logic of Violence in Drug War / Castillo, Juan Camilo ; Kronick, Dorothy

Kronick, Dorothy	Journal Article
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Drug traffickers sometimes share profits peacefully. Other times they fight. We propose a model to investigate this variation, focusing on the role of the state. Seizing illegal goods can paradoxically increase traffickers’ profits, and higher profits fuel violence. Killing kingpins makes crime bosses short-sighted, also fueling conflict. Only by targeting the most violent traffickers can the state reduce violence without increasing supply. These results help explain empirical patterns of violence in drug war, which is less studied than are interstate or civil war but often as deadly.

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Drug War ; Logic of Violence

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