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ID:
148052
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| Summary/Abstract |
Taking its point of departure in Donald Rumsfeld’s second term as US Secretary of Defense (2001–2006), this article analyses the crisis of strategic leadership in Western national security. Three “traps” are identified that explain why Donald Rumsfeld ultimately was a failure as defence secretary and demonstrate the perils of national security governance. These traps are termed the inquisitor trap, the strong leader trap and the delegation trap. It is argued that our understanding of strategic leadership in national security, particularly in defence, can benefit from insights gained from the study of strategic leadership in business. As such, this article engages the recent trend of merging insights from business and military strategy.
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| 2 |
ID:
171646
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyses findings from an original survey of 187 private military contractors on their incentives for working in the industry. Perceptions of contractors as “greedy, ruthless, and unscrupulous mercenaries” shape both public and military opinions of outsourcing and may impact U.S. military effectiveness, civil–military relations, and contractor identity. We find that contractors are motivated by a range of factors and that their financial experiences are not clearly more positive than that of state military troops. We recommend broad education of military and defense officials and the public in the U.S. and other relevant nations, regarding the true incentives of modern-day, Western contractors, in an effort to dispel misperceptions, increase effective utilisation of contractors, and beneficially shape PMC-military coordination. DoD may consider integrating such training into its current efforts to improve outsourcing, including its Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course, pre-deployment fora, and curricula of advanced military studies schools.
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