| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
165907
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
When states face a regulatory difference that impedes commerce between them, they have a range of options to choose from in how to pursue regulatory cooperation on that issue. They may attempt to unilaterally impose their position, attempt to negotiate binding agreements, promote mutual recognition, utilize networked governance, create private standards, rely on business self-regulation, or choose not to pursue cooperation. Each of these choices has implications for the commerce and international relations on that issue, and so the choice of policy route is of vital importance. This article builds on lobbying, regulation, and trade scholarship to advance a theory that explains how states choose a regulatory cooperation pathway.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
148158
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article addresses how transnational groups affect the security relationship between the states they reside in. I argue that this is determined by the differential threat perceptions of the host states. If the host states both consider the group to be a threat, the group is a shared problem and policy toward the group becomes an arena for cooperation for the two states. However, if one state views the group as a threat and the other does not, policy toward the group becomes an arena for conflict between them. I test this hypothesis with a comparative case study analysis of Turkey's relationships with the United States, Syria, and Iran vis-à-vis the Kurds after the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|