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| 1 |
ID:
156601
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| Summary/Abstract |
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been undergoing a profound transformation in terms of its operational capabilities, both with regard to its hardware as well as its heartware, i.e. the softer aspects of its development including its operational culture and military ethos. These changes have permeated every facet of the PLA – technological, organizational and doctrinal. Despite successive generations of Chinese leaders having declared their adherence to “peace” and “development,” it has become clearer that Beijing's security policy under Xi Jinping has shifted steadily away from “keeping a low profile.” In that regard, the status of the PLA in the domestic and international calculus of China's new commander-in-chief has, unsurprisingly, become more pronounced, with Xi taking noticeably greater interest in harnessing the Chinese Communist Party's coercive forces as his personal domestic powerbase and foreign policy instrument complementing China's hard economic power.
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| 2 |
ID:
177819
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Military Commission launched a major reorganization of the entire People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in early 2016, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has followed up with its own reforms at all levels. In February 2016, the changes entailed ‘above the neck’ reforms at PLAAF Headquarters and reduced the number of Military Region Air Force Headquarters from 7 to 5, renaming them Theatre Command Air Forces. Changes in 2017 focused on ‘below the neck’ reforms by creating a ‘base-brigade’ structure by reforming several command posts into bases; abolishing fighter, fighter-bomber, and ground attack aircraft air divisions; replacing air regiments with brigades; as well as changing the name of its former 15th Airborne Corps to Airborne Corps. Whilst the PLA leadership has moved ahead with pushing the PLAAF towards becoming a modern air force with enhanced aerial power alongside greater interoperability with the other PLA services, the reconstitution of its organizations has nevertheless led to a fallout due to policy changes concerning its rank-and-file.
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| 3 |
ID:
177816
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| Summary/Abstract |
A slew of structural changes to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) combat capabilities, deterrence as well as military operations other than war (MOOTW) were enacted following the announcement to streamline China’s armed forces in September 2015. Primarily driven by the Chinese military leadership’s desire to resolve longstanding shortcomings in the PLA’s ability to conduct combined arms and joint operations, unprecedented changes in the form of so-called ‘below the neck’ reforms gathered pace since the end of 2016. By focusing on those changes to the PLA’s established service branches as well as ‘new types’ of forces, this brief introduction will provide a summary of the prospects and problems as the Chinese military embarks on its latest endeavour to modernize itself.
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| 4 |
ID:
181581
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| Summary/Abstract |
Where China’s military build-up is concerned, adding some context to make up for the lack of transparency in its annual budget provides us with a better—albeit still limited—appreciation of the People’s Liberation Army budgetary allocations.
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| 5 |
ID:
148213
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since emerging as China’s top leader following the 18th Party Congress, Xi Jinping has moved swiftly to consolidate his formal authority as Central Military Commission chairman over the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. In redressing the civil-military imbalance wrought by Dengist economic reforms, the commander-in-chief has combined institutional mechanisms with the use of fear to impose authoritative civilian control over the military. This paper proposes that a combination of changes to the Chinese strategic environment has contributed to Xi’s utility of the anti-corruption campaign to purge the regime’s coercive forces of its previous underpinnings, and advances that the war on military malfeasance has given rise to a new set of dynamics in civil-military relations in post-Reform China.
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