| Summary/Abstract |
In 1992, more than 25,000 United States forces landed in Somalia as part of a 37,000-strong United Nations Task Force (UNITAF) operation. In 2011, a combined total of 8000+ Kenyan and Ethiopian forces were ordered into Somalia. This article demonstrates that American soldiers were deployed to Somalia in the early days of a post-Cold War world, largely as a foreign policy experiment about how to deal with the threats ‘small states’ posed in a new world order. It is maintained that Kenyan and Ethiopian soldiers were deployed to Somalia to deal with some of the very threats American foreign policymakers had identified almost two decades earlier, from refugees to terrorism. To conclude, the article uses public goods theory to contend that military interventions that are ostensibly peacekeeping in nature can be inherently inadequate because ‘self-interest works against the interests of the collective’ (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997: 726). Accordingly, America’s intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 1994 failed to remedy adequately the circumstances and concerns which spawned the perceived need for Kenyan and Ethiopian forces to intervene in Somalia a generation later, in 2011. Unfortunately for Kenyan and Ethiopian soldiers, Somalia’s politicians and political processes might relegate them to realizing little more success than their American predecessors.
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