| Summary/Abstract |
If a European organisation decides to deploy a military force in Mali or a police mission in Afghanistan, member states probably believe that collective security is a public good that benefits them all. But who will lead the mission? Who will staff it? Who will pay for it? Who will risk casualties? While rational-choice theorists expect little burden sharing, constructivists expect a great deal more insofar as normative pressures are brought to bear on governments. The problem is that it is hard to find countries that systematically eschew their responsibilities or, contrariwise, systematically contribute their fair share out of a sense of moral obligation. In this article, we analyse burden sharing as an anchoring practice, shedding light on the social logic of burden sharing rather than abstract interests or norms. Established after the end of the Second World War, the field of European security has given birth to a “community of security practice” around the more or less routine task of determining national contributions to crisis management operations. Based on interviews with practitioners from the UK, France, Germany, Norway and Ireland, we analyse the impact of intersubjectivity, power and strategic culture on the practice of burden sharing.
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