| Summary/Abstract |
Over the past century peak oil forecasts have had a profound influence on US foreign policy. Unquestioned acceptance of these forecasts, all of which proved wrong, repeatedly led policymakers to assume that rival powers sought to seize dwindling supplies or that disaffected exporter states would decline to sell. Perennial expectation of impending scarcity elevated the perceived importance of foreign oil, especially from the Middle East (ME). In response, increasingly aggressive US policies were adopted to secure ME oil. I call belief in an oil scarcity imperative for aggressive policy oil scarcity ideology. Policymakers’ concerns over oil's availability were repeatedly challenged by market information, which was always ignored. Recurring pessimism over future supply during times of high price was always followed by oversupply and low price, yet aggressive polices to secure supply were never reassessed after scarcity failed to materialize. Scarcity ideology's exemption from scrutiny drove a policy ratchet: US–ME policy could become more aggressive, but not less.
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