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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
167951
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| Summary/Abstract |
In June 2018, the Chinese government initiated a new round of reforms to reshuffle
the leadership of the China Coast Guard (CCG) so as to better administer the
country’s blue territory. In contrast to the 2013 structural reform of the Chinese
government which created the CCG and made it part of the State Oceanic
Administration, a sub-ministerial organ of the Chinese State Council, the 2018
reform placed the agency under direct command of the Communist Party’s Central
Military Commission. This paper argues that the CCG today has been a formidable
maritime giant and acquired a fair ability to coordinate its patrol operations with
other agencies in recent years. In particular, the maritime law enforcement force
has been made more militarized given its close association with the Chinese
Navy. Nonetheless, despite the notable performance the CCG has made, it still
faces problems of unclear legal status and weak airborne surveillance capabilities,
keeping its institutional reform far from full completion. Moreover, a more
powerful coast guard force can on the one hand facilitate Beijing’s aim to become
a great maritime power but on the other hand lead to more security challenges as a
harsher maritime contest between China and its strategic competitors is likely to be
witnessed in the near future.
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| 2 |
ID:
172657
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article inquiries into the causes, logic, and likely regional consequences of Beijing's decision to shift control of the China Coast Guard (CCG) from a joint civilian-military paradigm to a stricly military one. Amid the upgrading of insular features in the Spratlys, the deployment of bombers in the Paracels, and overall modernization of China’s naval capabilities, the article also explores plausible developments in which the People's Armed Police-led CCG, irregular maritime militias, and People’s Liberation Army Navy forces might coordinate more effectively efforts to safeguard self-proclaimed rights in littoral and blue-water areas in dispute.
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| 3 |
ID:
148534
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since late 2012, Chinese President Xi Jinping has introduced far-ranging measures to “build China into a maritime power (建設海洋强國).” One notable campaign was the creation of a centralized China Coast Guard (CCG) force and the National Oceanic Commission (NOC), as the previous lack of a functional mechanism to coordinate China`s maritime policies and five maritime law enforcement agencies, the “five dragons,” has been a longstanding problem hindering the country from effectively administering its maritime territories. This paper argues that the operational functions of the CCG have been developed, although not fully, and CCG vessels are now undertaking patrol missions in an orderly pattern. Nevertheless, at the policymaking level, the progress of the reform is rather limited. Particularly, the development of the NOC, an organ responsible for the “top-level design” of China`s grand maritime strategy, as well as the legal foundations for the CCG`s operations are still incomplete. Moreover, Beijing`s decision not to incorporate the Maritime Safety Administration into the CCG suggests that the country is adopting an old logic of “crossing the river by feeling the stones (摸着石頭過河)” while still pledging to reach its maritime power goal, part of the Chinese dream for national rejuvenation.
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| 4 |
ID:
181405
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent years, the dispute over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, which had been modestly managed with no significant challenge to Japan’s effective control, has developed into a new phase, with heightened tensions and a risk of clashes. A notable trend is that the intrusions of China Coast Guard ships into the Japanese contiguous zone and territorial sea off the Senkaku islands have become more frequent and their stay in these waters has become longer. China appears to have shifted its strategy from a regular presence in these waters to the exercise of law enforcement authority in sovereign waters.
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