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ID:
187058
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| Summary/Abstract |
While economic sanctions are often used as a foreign policy tool to fight state-sponsored terrorism, their efficacy remains unclear. This article argues that the intensifying economic hardship caused by sanctions forces the targeted governments to undertake a retrenchment strategy, which in turn reduces the overall frequency of state-sponsored terrorist attacks. Using cross-sectional-time-series data of Iranian-backed terrorism from 1987 to 2005, the article shows that sanctions against the Iranian regime were instrumental in reducing terrorist attacks by Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
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| 2 |
ID:
160632
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why do Chinese traders along the China–North Korea border turn to informal trade, and what does it provide for them? Using a unique set of interviews with Chinese formal and informal traders operating in North Korea, we argue that the strategies of informal trade are a calculated response to certain types of risk. In doing so, we introduce a typology of risks and the mechanisms by which informal trade allows traders to mitigate those risks. Because informal traders bypass trade regulations and border checkpoints, they are able to mitigate risk more cheaply than formal traders in some cases and can overcome barriers that can cause failure in formal trade. Informal traders can thus maintain trade in many circumstances, including across North Korean personnel instability and policy reversals, Chinese sanctions enforcement, and delays and smuggling crackdowns on both sides of the border.
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| 3 |
ID:
148636
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