| Summary/Abstract |
Behind the public display of Sino–North Vietnamese unity in the anti-American resistance during the height of the People’s Republic of China’s Cultural Revolution from 1965 to 1969, Beijing’s insistence on Hanoi’s acceptance of Maoist ideology coupled with its assertive demand for Hanoi to denounce Soviet revisionism politicised its economic and technical assistance to North Vietnam. Although appreciating Beijing’s enthusiasm to aid North Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [DRV] resented Beijing’s political and ideological objective of promoting Maoism and anti-Soviet revisionism in North Vietnam. In response, the DRV government asserted independent decision-making and bureaucratic control over the management of foreign economic and technical aid, which in turn collided with the Chinese assertion of superiority and insistence on their control over all China-aided projects. The fragmentation of Chinese bureaucratic institutions and the political chauvinism of some radical Maoists at the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi, who oversaw Chinese aid to North Vietnam, further hindered Beijing’s ability to exert significant influence over Hanoi.
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