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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
186524
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study examines the impact of natural resource rents on terrorism via inequality channel in 34 African economies, straddling the period 1980–2012. This study employs a negative binomial regression, in which the following findings are established: first, the unconditional impact of natural resource rents on terrorism is found to be positive across the model specifications, particularly when Gini and Theil indices are controlled for. Second, inequality has no discernable first-order impact on terrorism across the board. Third, the marginal impacts of interactions between inequality measures, specifically Gini and Theil coefficients and total natural resource rents on terrorism are significantly negative. Four, the corresponding net effects of interactions between natural resource rents and inequality (Gini and Theil coefficients) on terrorism are positive, thus lending support to earlier submission of involving all constitutive variables in the specifications for the parameters to make economic sense. The results are robust to accounting for fixed and country effects using the Poisson Pseudo maximum likelihood high-dimension fixed effects estimator. On the policy front, maintaining fairness and equity in the distribution of rents from the ‘free gifts of nature’ remains a veritable policy menu, especially for the resource-rich economies, to counteracting terrorist activities.
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| 2 |
ID:
150655
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| Summary/Abstract |
Economic theory predicts that rents produced from natural resources, especially oil and gas, can increase opportunities for entrepreneurship, but they may also reduce engagement in entrepreneurial activities as they change incentives towards rent-seeking. Using Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) annual surveys, this study provides empirical evidence that more per capita profit from oil and gas reduces entrepreneurship only in corrupt environments. The more the corruption is, the larger is the impact. The results have important implications for policy makers, especially in resource rich developing countries.
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| 3 |
ID:
171065
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper develops a model where an incumbent may try to bribe the security forces to repress the political opposition in order to improve his/her chances of winning the elections. Such situations can be demonstrated by the cases of Cambodia, Uganda and Zimbabwe where the political leadership has used repression in and around the election times. In a collusive equilibrium, the security forces produce violence and the leader responds by giving a bribe to the former, this pair of actions taking place in each period. A collusive equilibrium exists when the bribe that a leader is prepared to pay is at least as large as the bribe that the security forces are willing to accept. We find that a harsher expected punishment (e.g. a longer prison sentence) will improve an incumbent’s incentives to collude. In contrast, security forces expecting a harsher punishment will be less likely to repress. Furthermore, we discuss the circumstances under which windfall revenue (e.g. foreign aid, resource rents) may contribute to violence and when it may prevent it.
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