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| 1 |
ID:
179100
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| Summary/Abstract |
Joseph F. Fletcher, Jr. (1934–1984) was a historian of China and Central Asia1, but not just a historian of China and Central Asia: he was also a scholar of Asia broadly understood, writing on topics ranging from Islamic Inner Asia to the Turco-Mongolian tradition in the Ottoman Empire. When the Historical IR (HIST) Section of the International Studies Association decided to institute an annual prize for edited volumes, I – as the chair of the section2 – suggested that we name3 the prize after Joseph F. Fletcher, for two reasons. First, perhaps because he died relatively young, most of Fletcher’s output is found in edited volumes. Second, and more importantly, even while he is writing about a specific region, Fletcher’s writing sparkles with a comparative perspective, unearthing unexpected similarities and connections. This is unusual, especially in a historian of his generation. You could say that Fletcher was doing global history (or even global IR) before it became a ‘thing.’ The combination of these two factors made Fletcher the ideal historian to name our prize after, not the least because the HIST section advocates not only for historical scholarship but for historical IR scholarship that has a global comparative and international outlook as its starting point.
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| 2 |
ID:
189086
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| Summary/Abstract |
The post-1945 international order is in crisis, spurring a wide-ranging debate about its future in a period of rapid global change. A critical dimension of this crisis has been neglected by existing perspectives, however. At multiple levels the post-1945 international order is being challenged by claims of justice. Diverse actors criticize the order for its economic inequalities, social hierarchies, institutional unfairness, intergenerational inequities, and historical and epistemic injustices. This article, which serves as an introduction to a special section on ‘Injustice and the crisis of international order’ seeks to map and explicate this polymorphic politics of global justice. We begin by reviewing past debates about justice and order in world politics, highlighting their narrow and over-stylized engagement with justice politics. To fill this gap, we develop a typology of contemporary justice claims, differentiating between recognitional, institutional, distributive, historical and epistemic, and intergenerational claims. Our goal is not only to distinguish these distinct kinds of justice claims, however. We argue that justice claims are also intersectional, multiscalar and multivocal, with significant implications for how the relationship between justice and order is managed in contemporary world politics.
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| 3 |
ID:
189096
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| Summary/Abstract |
Struggles for recognition, rooted in the desire to be acknowledged by others, are fundamental to the stability of international orders. All international orders face actors with recognition grievances, and sometimes these grievances become major sources of contention. At the same time, each international order faces struggles that are specific to its mode of legitimation because they are rooted in challenges over the constituent elements of that order. The liberal international order (LIO) is no exception to this rule. Unlike international orders that are organized through explicit social hierarchies, the LIO claims to foster egalitarian, meritocratic justice based around universal, ‘rational’ standards. Yet it is clear to many actors around the world that the LIO has historically been, and remains today, premised on ‘irrational’, unjust forms of hierarchical recognition, often organized around group identity. This opens up the LIO to charges of hypocrisy. We trace the ways in which this ‘hypocrisy charge’ is levelled by both LIO ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’, arguing that it generates an irresolvable tension within the LIO. This tension may not spell the end of the LIO, but it does point to a period of extended contention.
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| 4 |
ID:
162491
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article makes two contributions. First, I argue that contrary to what was often assumed in the recognition literature, social hierarchies (as in the Hegelian master–slave dynamic) are very stable. Though social hierarchies are relationships of misrecognition, they nevertheless allow for the simulation of recognition for ‘the master’, and also trap ‘the slave’ in that role through stigmatisation. Second, I make a historical argument about the state and its role in recognition struggles. The modern state is relatively unique (historically speaking) in being tasked with solving the recognition problems of its citizens. At the same time, the modern state has to derive its own sovereignty from the recognition of those same citizens. There is an inherent tension between these two facts, which forces the modern state to turn increasingly outward for its own recognition. This is why ‘the master–slave dynamic’ was increasingly projected onto the international stage from nineteenth century onwards (along with the diffusion of the modern state model). As a result, international recognition came to play an even larger role in state sovereignty than domestic recognition (in contrast to common historical practice). This also explains how and why social hierarchies came to dominate international politics around the same time as the norm of sovereign equality.
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| 5 |
ID:
151179
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this brief essay, I explore the relationship between ‘states’ (or more broadly, institutions of political authority) and ontological security. Drawing from historical examples, I argue that it is a mistake to assume that all ‘states’ seek ontological security: this generalisation applies only to those polities that claim to be the main ontological security providers. I then develop a typology of institutional ontological security provision arrangements as have existed throughout history, arguing that another reason the concept of ontological security is valuable for international relations (IR) is because it offers a way to compare systems across time and space without assuming the primacy of politics or religion. In summary, IR does not have to limit its use of the concept of ontological security to a synonym for ‘state identity’ – ontological security can offer much more than that by helping the discipline reach across time and space.
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| 6 |
ID:
156176
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