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ID:
175173
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| Summary/Abstract |
This exploration provides an alternative future to that offered in the discussions surrounding what is often referred to by the ‘fourth industrial revolution’ or the ‘third offset’. I argue that even modest projections of existing trends have the capability of altering the grammar or ecology of geopolitics as well as the drivers for competition and catastrophe. Such changes are more significant than questions of how this or that actor might be different or which great powers may shape the international order in a hundred years. The essay seeks to understand what disruptive changes in non-human capability might mean for the shape of a potential geopolitics to come. In a more general sense, I want to think about how violence will be distributed differently. Will there be new sources and even kinds of competition unique to a global system populated and in some cases, structured by cunning machines – some mechanical, others digital – and what are the implications for how we imagine international relations?
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| 2 |
ID:
151368
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| Summary/Abstract |
We must emphasize the link—networks of immediately actionable predictive information, supported by autonomous learning collaborative machines—as the next great strategic advantage over our enemies.
Offset strategies allow U.S. defense leaders to identify revolutionary steps to pivot our military capabilities whenever our strategic advantages are threatened. Rather than match an opponent in an unfavorable competition, the objective is to turn the competition to our favor by applying our strengths to problems that appear unwinnable, or winnable only at unacceptable cost. Faced with a loss of currency against emerging threats, President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “New Look” Strategy in the 1950s marked a lethality revolution in U.S. defense planning.
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| 3 |
ID:
156946
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| Summary/Abstract |
Third offset technologies are represented as game changing with respect to their implications for U.S. military strategy. In general, third offset technologies as applied to the art of war will emphasize information-driven conventional weapons that are smaller, lighter, and smarter, compared to earlier generations. How will weapons and systems based on third offset technologies coexist with nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and what are the implications for deterrence and other forms of nuclear persuasion? The discussion here considers various aspects of the nuclear-third offset relationship while acknowledging that it is an open ended question for scientists, military planners and policy makers.
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