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| 1 |
ID:
164625
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| Summary/Abstract |
The multi-vector policy adopted by the Central Asian countries provides a basis for a flexible approach in their relations with competing international actors to acquire payoffs from economic and military affiliations or partnerships. Consequently, we expect that the defense-industrialization and procurement practices in the region would follow a similar path. However, a closer look reveals that Russia is still the dominant actor in the security and defense-industrial relations in the region. This article argues that perceived threats to regime security, the patrimonial system of rule, and weak industrial bases push Central Asian countries toward Russia as well as hindering the development of capable defense industry.
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| 2 |
ID:
151396
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| Summary/Abstract |
Turkey has been investing in its national defence industrial base since the 1980s. As with other developing countries, Turkey’s motivations for investing in national defence industries can be boiled down to the pursuit of defence autarky, economic benefits and international prestige. However, after 40 years of investment, Turkey is unable to reach the primary goals of defence industrialisation. We argue that three factors are important to understanding Turkey’s persistence in these primary goals. First, Turkey believes that there is an overall improvement in its defence industrial capabilities and the goal of autarky is still reachable. Second, increased defence exports support the belief that Turkish defence industries have become sustainable and the trend will continue in the future. The third reason, perhaps most important of all, has to do with the domestic political gains of defence industrialisation: the AKP uses defence industry and indigenous weapon systems for prestige and, therefore, garners broader support.
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