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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
151583
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| Summary/Abstract |
Relying on fieldwork conducted in two provinces, this article provides a systemic study of China's Government Work Reports (GWRs), examining their function, format, how they are formulated and implemented, their content and their research values. Whilst the existing literature mostly focuses on central government reports, this research integrates GWRs from all administrative levels. I argue that over time, the GWRs have developed into a highly institutionalized nationwide system with two important aspects – local elites’ autonomy in setting work agendas, and their compliance with central government policy priorities. Additionally, my study shows that by using quantifiable targets and celebrating achievements framed in concrete statistics, the GWRs help to sustain the legitimacy of the party-state. Finally, my study finds GWRs to be a versatile scholarly resource that can be used for various research interests and methods.
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| 2 |
ID:
192745
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study innovatively divided consumption-based CO2 emissions of developed countries into domestic and foreign components using an environmentally extended multi-regional input–output model, and revealed their different driving factors using the structural decomposition analysis method. The results showed that the consumption-based emission peaked in 16 developed countries, with 14 countries peaking around 2008. Domestic emissions in all 16 developed countries had peaked, most of which accounted for 40–70% of the total consumption-based emissions. However, the foreign emissions driven by 9 peaking countries still kept increasing. Regarding domestic emissions, the decline of domestic carbon intensity was the main driving factor across 16 peaking countries. In terms of foreign emissions, carbon intensity decline, especially in main medium- and low-income countries, was the dominant factor in the CO2 emissions decrease. Significant improvements in production technology levels of medium-income countries played a key role in weakening the carbon-increasing effects of foreign emissions during the post-peak period. Thus, to further promote global carbon emissions to peak as soon as possible, peaking developed countries should provide more emission reduction funds and technologies to support the decline in carbon intensity and the improvement of production technology in medium- and low-income countries.
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| 3 |
ID:
183058
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Chinese government introduces a series of intervention measures to promote the collecting and recycling of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE). However, under the current government intervention measures, the enthusiasm of stakeholders to participate is not high. Therefore, it is necessary to study the evolution of each stakeholder's willingness to participate under government intervention measures. This paper regards consumers as the stakeholder to construct a four-party evolutionary game model composed of the government, consumers, the collector, and the recycler and studies the dynamic evolution strategy of each stakeholder and the stable strategy of the evolutionary game model. The results indicate that providing incentive measures may not necessarily enable stakeholders to participate in the collecting and recycling of WEEE. In addition, even if no incentive measures are given, as long as the government strictly supervises and takes severe penalty measures, this also can enable consumers, the collector, and the recycler to participate in the collecting and recycling of WEEE. This paper provides a theoretical tool for the government to formulate a reasonable government intervention mechanism and also provides reference and guidance for other countries with a low WEEE recycling rate to improve their own intervention measures.
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| 4 |
ID:
158633
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| Summary/Abstract |
Existing literature on China’s Performance Evaluation System and how it shapes cadre behavior tends to assume a hierarchy of work targets either through the framework of soft targets, hard targets, and priority targets with veto power or through target measurability. However, this traditional conceptualization of target hierarchy can no longer capture the nature of content of today’s Performance Evaluation System nor can it explain cadre behavior under the new economic and political order imposed by Xi Jinping. Based on field research conducted in various administrative level localities of four provinces during 2014, 2016, and 2017, I argue that today’s Performance Evaluation System has evolved into an increasingly balanced system driven by three prevailing features: the diminishing hard/soft targets dichotomy, the much more constrained power of priority targets with veto power, and the comprehensive quantification of evaluation targets. This study contributes to an updated understanding of the incentive mechanism of the Performance Evaluation System and how that can help explain cadre behavior today. The findings of the research have important political and economic implications on the Xi administration and the Communist Party.
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