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| 1 |
ID:
158148
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| Summary/Abstract |
Between 1969 and 1971 US diplomat Joseph Sisco was the driving force behind all initial steps to resolve the Israeli‒Egyptian conflict. But despite his tremendous efforts, his ability was limited as President Nixon did not throw his weight behind these efforts. Three main initiatives were taken during the discussed period: the Rogers Plan, the Rogers Initiative, and Sadat’s initiative for an interim agreement. Most of Sisco’s efforts concentrated on the latter initiative. His failure to reach an interim agreement, coupled with his inability to persuade Israel and Egypt to accept the Rogers Plan, led the region to political stagnation, from which the two parties only emerged in the aftermath of 1973 Yom Kippur War.
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| 2 |
ID:
161383
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| Summary/Abstract |
As a military clash that it is still unclear if anyone truly wanted, the June 1967 Six Day War remains one of the most curious military conflicts in modern history. Israel certainly did not prefer the military route, and neither did Egypt, Syria, or the Soviet Union. Yet while it was clear to these parties from the outset that nothing good could come from such a clash, they backed Israel into a corner from which it was unable to extricate itself without going to war. This article explores the factors that caused the war at the time and in the manner it did.
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| 3 |
ID:
151811
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| Summary/Abstract |
The October 1973 war severely tested the relations of the Israeli government and military authorities with the national and foreign news media. Much has been said about the role of government and military press control and news management in muting and failing to bring to public notice the increasing signs of Egyptian and Syrian intentions before the war’s sudden outbreak. This article will focus on Israeli army news management during the war itself, a complex military campaign which opened in great disarray and with setbacks. Largely based on recently available archive material shedding light on the IDF’s wartime press work and on discussions and decision-making in the IDF high command, the paper examines the ways in which government and military sought to control and manage news reporting in the domestic and foreign media. It charts in particular the reasons for the growing distrust of statements by Israeli leaders and officially disseminated information in the early stages of the war, as well as the difficulties of the military apparatus in controlling the media, even when defeat turned eventually into victory. More than 40 years later, the issues discussed remain pertinent.
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