| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
166902
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
German organizations are among the last Palestine solidarity groups in Europe to have embraced the call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS), launched in 2005. Pro-Israel German groups have been quick to respond with aggressive rhetoric equating a BDS-favorable stance with Nazism. The vilification of the movement has had the unintended consequence of inserting BDS into German politics, both at federal and local levels. Select case studies show that the BDS debate in Germany has developed somewhat differently than in other European countries, and that religious discourse is significant in shaping attitudes to Israel and Palestine. While the Palestine solidarity movement tends to single out the “Anti-Germans”—a pro-Israel formation that grew out of the Left after the reunification of Germany—as the major culprit, it is in fact conservative Christian, mostly Evangelical, organizations that are largely responsible for discouraging BDS activism.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
160233
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This analysis highlights the role of sport—particularly football—in nation-building. Using netnographic techniques, it focuses on the Palestinian struggle for self-determination and nationhood through the efforts of the Palestinian Football Association [PFA] to challenge Israeli hegemony and function independently of Israeli surveillance in a sovereign Palestinian nation-state. It explains how the PFA has attempted to harness its status, manifested in its Fédération Internationale de Football Association [FIFA] membership, to threaten Israel’s own FIFA membership and its international image. The value of this analysis stems from the way it embeds the empirical narrative within a broader international relations analytical/theoretical framework that problematises the central concept of “soft power” that has predominated the current “sports and international relations” literature.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
177566
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The purpose of this article is to show that most problems that Israel has faced in the public opinion domain in recent decades were evident already in the wake of the Six Day War. Israel either ignored or miscomprehended their significance. While it has become a struggle over the consciousness of the world in general, and the younger generations in Israel and abroad in particular, Israel treated it as a problem of internal and external ‘Hasbara’ (explaining) and has been unprepared and ill equipped to cope with it.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
160295
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Israel’s image in the world and its attempts at public diplomacy have always provoked intense discussion and criticism at home and abroad. Through analysis of reports, official documents, and protocols, this article shows how weaknesses in public policymaking undermine the establishment of Israel’s public diplomacy. Israel’s weakness in public policymaking and crisis of governance preclude the possibility of encompassing official measures for an efficient decision-making process, or for long-term strategic planning. This ‘institutional void’ is filled by the IDF, creating a process that causes the ‘security mindset’ to triumph over all other foreign policy factors. The outcome is a less effective Hasbara, which also affects broader diplomatic considerations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
151811
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The October 1973 war severely tested the relations of the Israeli government and military authorities with the national and foreign news media. Much has been said about the role of government and military press control and news management in muting and failing to bring to public notice the increasing signs of Egyptian and Syrian intentions before the war’s sudden outbreak. This article will focus on Israeli army news management during the war itself, a complex military campaign which opened in great disarray and with setbacks. Largely based on recently available archive material shedding light on the IDF’s wartime press work and on discussions and decision-making in the IDF high command, the paper examines the ways in which government and military sought to control and manage news reporting in the domestic and foreign media. It charts in particular the reasons for the growing distrust of statements by Israeli leaders and officially disseminated information in the early stages of the war, as well as the difficulties of the military apparatus in controlling the media, even when defeat turned eventually into victory. More than 40 years later, the issues discussed remain pertinent.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|