| Summary/Abstract |
The October 1973 war severely tested the relations of the Israeli government and military authorities with the national and foreign news media. Much has been said about the role of government and military press control and news management in muting and failing to bring to public notice the increasing signs of Egyptian and Syrian intentions before the war’s sudden outbreak. This article will focus on Israeli army news management during the war itself, a complex military campaign which opened in great disarray and with setbacks. Largely based on recently available archive material shedding light on the IDF’s wartime press work and on discussions and decision-making in the IDF high command, the paper examines the ways in which government and military sought to control and manage news reporting in the domestic and foreign media. It charts in particular the reasons for the growing distrust of statements by Israeli leaders and officially disseminated information in the early stages of the war, as well as the difficulties of the military apparatus in controlling the media, even when defeat turned eventually into victory. More than 40 years later, the issues discussed remain pertinent.
|