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| 1 |
ID:
151847
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| Summary/Abstract |
The author vividly records his impressions of life in the Western Aden Protectorate in the 1960s during the years leading up to the independence of the territory in 1967. As a political officer advising various Arab tribal leaders he describes how his responsibilities could range far wider than the provisions of the Advisory Treaties, and he offers personal conclusions about the collapse of British and Arab authority resulting, in his view, from a misguided attempt to turn tribal sheikhs into a coalition of Indian rulers, creating the shaky structure of a Federal government that collapsed in the face of rag-tag opposition from nationalist activists.
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| 2 |
ID:
151836
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| Summary/Abstract |
Five decades after withdrawing its troops from Aden for the last time, the decision by the Government of Harold Wilson to abandon the Federation of South Arabia (FSA) and with it, the various tribal potentates that had aligned themselves with this project in state creation continues to generate vociferous debate. For some, any attempt to configure a modern state from a largely tribal field was doomed to fail as internecine conflict; regional rivalries punctured the illusion of a unified Federal identity, let alone a coherent state. For others, it was a lack of British political resolve as well as investment of the necessary treasure that forced the issue and saw London abandon erstwhile allies to an often bloody fate with the emergence of a Marxist-led regime in what became South Yemen after 1967. Yet just three years later, Britain oversaw the creation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from a collection of tribal entities, a state creation project that continues to endure. In a series of articles written by leading historians of the region as well as former diplomats, this issue of Middle Eastern Studies sets out to compare and contrast the circumstances and context surrounding the failure of the FSA with the establishment of the UAE, the legacy of which continues to shape the politics and security of the Gulf region in the twenty first century.
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| 3 |
ID:
151845
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The British decision to withdraw from Aden in 1967 was a political decision made because of Labour's distaste for imperialism and empire. As Aden descended into chaos and disorder, the Americans watched with equanimity; accepting an increased Soviet and Chinese presence in the Federation after British withdrawal. Later, the Nixon administration supported British attempts to federate tiny Arabian sheikhdoms on the tip of the Arabian Peninsula into the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The main American concern was for Britain to hand over the Tunbs and Musa Islands to the Shah of Iran whom Nixon had anointed American shieldbearer in the Gulf. This the British willingly did in order to secure access to the lucrative Iranian market, while at the same time the Heath government succeeded in creating the UAE.
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| 4 |
ID:
151840
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The National Liberation Front (NLF), set up in 1963, took over South Arabia in 1967 to form the People's Republic of South Yemen (renamed the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen – PDRY -- in 1971). I ask how the NLF achieved its goal in such a short period of time, ending the 129-year British presence in South Arabia. The NLF's focus on the armed struggle was the crucial factor but it could not have succeeded without the support of Egypt and a friendly regime in Sanaa, and taking advantage of a growing unwillingness in London to pay the financial and human costs of staying. The NLF understood that the hinterland, long seen as protecting Aden, offered the best route for attacking it. While the final battle would have to be in Aden, the war should start in the protectorates. Violence was accompanied by political work to build an organization to mobilize popular support and defeat rival nationalist organizations.
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| 5 |
ID:
151844
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Despite the apparent similarities in Britain's relationship with the Sheikhdoms of the Lower Gulf and the traditional states of southern Arabia, British policy-makers pursued contrasting policies towards the two sets of territories in the era of decolonization. As regards South Arabia, Britain followed a policy of amalgamating the states into a ‘Whitehall’ federation. The fact that the Federation of South Arabia remained dependent on British backing, and in consequence became ineffably associated with British imperialism in an era of anti-colonial Arab nationalism, fatally damaged its chances of longevity. Applying the lessons of failure in South Arabia, the British were far more inconspicuous in the discussions which led to the creation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Indeed, the fact that the UAE essentially emerged from the initiative of Sheikhs Zaid of Abu Dhabi and Rashid of Dubai, rather than the British, was one of the key factors in its survival. By contrast, the Federation of South Arabia collapsed ignominiously once the ballast provided by the British had been removed.
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| 6 |
ID:
151846
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE) was the result of more than three years of failed negotiations to unify the nine pre-state shaykhdoms. Thus, the formation of the UAE may be viewed as a success born of failure. In the period following the 1968 British announcement, the political events that led to the formation of the modern state of the UAE were largely a product of the competition for power or protection between the rulers of the nine pre-state shaykhdoms. This article explains how the personal rivalries and historical animosities between the ruling shaykhs manifested themselves and shaped events that led to the formation of the UAE in 1971.
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| 7 |
ID:
151839
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The failure of the state-building project, the insurgency and, to use the famous phrase, Britain's ‘scuttle’, or ignominious withdrawal, from South Arabia have long been the subject of study, receiving attention from many angles and new perspectives. One aspect which has received less attention is the role of policing in the state-building project of the Federation of South Arabia. This article sets out to explore this lacuna by contextualizing the role of policing in state-building and examining the impact of its absence in the case of South Arabia. It is clear that Britain left it very late to attempt the construction of a Federal State in the face of mounting pressures and challenges, and even later to establish a proper Federal Police Service. The article thus examines the argument that the lack of developed policing structures was the missing link in the state-building process before asking if Britain simply left the construction of effective and unified policing structures too late, or whether this was simply an impossible task.
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| 8 |
ID:
151841
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British overnments' relationships with President Nasser's Egypt were extremely difficult in the 1950s and 1960s due to conflicting regional interests. This article explores the crisis in Anglo-Egyptian relations over the Yemen Civil War and the insurgency in the Federation of South Arabia focusing on the period between 1962 and 1965. It demonstrates how British attempts to frustrate Egypt's intervention in the Yemen eventually led to the unleashing of an Egyptian backed insurgency in the Federation and accelerated the decision of Britain to withdraw from its Aden base and the Federation of South Arabia.
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| 9 |
ID:
151843
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| Summary/Abstract |
The emergence of Yemeni nationalism during the civil war in North Yemen (1962--70) inspired the southern revolutionary movement that contributed to the defeat of the British Empire in South Yemen. Drawn to the expanding war, a steady stream of transnational organizations, media correspondents and clandestine organizations turned South Arabia into an arena of global conflict, with Aden serving as the main gateway to the battleground. The actions of British colonial officials were subsequently scrutinized and criticized by this international spotlight, pressuring colonial officials to curtail military actions against Yemeni nationalists and announce an earlier date for British withdrawal from Aden and an abandonment of the Federation of South Arabia (FSA).
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| 10 |
ID:
151837
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Labour Government's decision to withdraw from Britain's overseas bases east of Suez in the 1960s had profound repercussions for British grand strategy. One of the last colonies to be evacuated was the port town of Aden, located on the south-western tip of the Arabian Peninsula. First seized by the East India Company on behalf of the British Empire in 1839, it became a Crown Colony almost a century later in 1937. By 1963, the British government had presided over Aden's entry into the fledgling Federation of South Arabia, a transitional body that was envisaged as a vehicle for independence. Drawing on the Labour's Party's archives, amongst a range of other sources, this article examines the shift in policy within the Labour government on the issue of Aden. It makes the case that, in contrast to the Conservative government's wholehearted support for Britain's tribal allies in South Arabia, Labour hedged its bets by balancing its policy off between the tribal rulers and the new radical nationalist opposition. By refusing to back the fledgling Federation government, Labour, instead, adopted a non-committal stance that would lead to greater strategic inertia in its policy towards the Middle East during the Cold War.
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