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ID:
189270
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| Summary/Abstract |
Do security guarantees affect people's willingness to spend their country's “blood and treasure” in a military crisis? Recent research finds that international legal commitments reshape domestic policy preferences. However, the focus of that scholarship is traditionally on issues such as human rights that define a society's normative obligations. In this study, we deploy two original survey experiments in the United States describing a potential military crisis on the Korean peninsula. We find that increasing the salience of the 1953 agreement between Washington and Seoul increases support for military action and that individuals become both more tolerant of U.S. military deaths and North Korean civilian casualties. In addition, the breadth of these effects increases when individuals are provided more detail about the agreement. These results extend the analysis of international law and domestic preferences into the domain of national security politics.
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| 2 |
ID:
186705
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite winning the presidency in 2016, Donald Trump alleged “millions of illegal votes” and other election fraud. He continued using this rhetoric throughout his tenure as president and ultimately suggested that if he did not win reelection in 2020, it would be because it somehow was stolen from him. Through an original survey experiment, this article explores how such allegations of fraud influence the public’s attitudes toward the conduct of elections, election outcomes, representation, and democracy as a whole. In doing so, we found that respondents expressed significantly and substantively more negative attitudes toward elections and democracy after being exposed to claims of fraud (even without evidence). Additionally, Republican identifiers were more likely than Democrats or Independents to doubt that their vote was counted fairly. These results bear important implications for our current understanding of politics in the United States.
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| 3 |
ID:
152120
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| Summary/Abstract |
Under which circumstances do two democracies involved in a dispute decide to pursue binding conflict management? I argue that the existing literature is incomplete. In order to fully understand why democratic decision makers choose arbitration or adjudication over alternative strategies, it is necessary to consider the social trust levels of the general populations in both states. During arbitration and adjudication, states give up sovereignty in a crucial domain of foreign policy. This loss of control should be less problematic for high-trusting societies than their low-trusting counterparts. If citizens are generally optimistic about the behavior of strangers, they are more likely to place their country’s interests under the control of others. Furthermore, since the general population poses smaller constraints on decision makers in nondemocratic settings, I expect the effect of trust to be strongest in democratic dyads. An empirical analysis with a new data set of social trust provides support for this hypothesis.
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