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| 1 |
ID:
185342
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the development and performance of formal organisational learning processes in the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) during the Donbas War (2014-present). Through original empirical research conducted with UAF personnel and documentary analysis, the article develops understanding about the detail of UAF lessons-learned processes and their effectiveness in helping to recalibrate UAF activities to operational demands. The article finds that the performance of UAF lessons-learned processes during the Donbas War has, on the whole, been poor. Since the escalation of Russian aggression in 2014, some positive steps which have been taken to implement best-practices in UAF lessons-learned processes. However, the article uncovers a number of organisational activities, structures and processes which could be improved to weaken the negative impact of bureaucratic politics and organisational culture on learning. It concludes with recommendations for the further development of UAF lessons-learned processes. The article highlights the particular importance of improving the capacity of the civilian leadership to exert effective oversight of military learning and of US and NATO support for these efforts.
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| 2 |
ID:
190524
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| Summary/Abstract |
The author considers the state of Ukraine's Armed Forces at the end of the Soviet period and today, and notes that Ukraine's military cooperation has been reoriented toward closer relations with Western countries, especially NATO members.
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| 3 |
ID:
152222
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the military change that has taken place in Ukraine since the conflict in the east began in 2014 and argues that the Ukrainian military that is emerging from this process is very different from that envisaged by earlier governments. The realities of the conflict on Ukraine from 2014 onwards have necessitated a move away from the transformational model of military reform adopted from 2006 to 2014. Instead, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have been forced to adapt their structure, means, and methods according to a complex blend of the resuscitation of older features and the embrace of new solutions. This process notably has included the adoption of mass, crowdfunding, and the raising of volunteer battalions. These changes provide the foundation for what is likely to continue to be a painful process of far-reaching military reform.
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