|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
152314
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Why has the Western strategy of engagement towards China been less effective than initially heralded? Juxtaposing theoretical advances in the International Relations (IR) scholarship against the evolution of China’s domestic politics and foreign behaviour, this article critically examines the socialization scholarship, not only because of the tremendous amount of theoretical purchase constructivists have invested in it, but also because liberal-minded IR scholars have predictably relied upon this line of inquiry to endorse a strategy of engagement and integration towards an outsider power such as China. I argue that the effects of engagement/socialization are often overstated and oversold, because conventional constructivists, in their attempt to specify the conditions under which certain behavioural adaptation constitutes identity change, tend to obfuscate some issues of theoretical and methodological concern. Two approaches are under the spotlight. First, transnationalism, as it pertains to China, has a poor record of engendering and sustaining domestic political change, because the party-state, firmly in the driver’s seat, fiercely rebuffs any foreign attempt that it deems to undermine its iron-clad hold on state power. Secondly, international institutions are not as transformative as claimed by constructivists, who conflate the distinction between agents and principals. Furthermore, the socialization perspective’s penchant for positioning the state in question in a reactive mode can be an analytical straitjacket, in turn rendering it outdated and inadequate to capture the critically important dynamics and dimensions of a great power such as China in international politics and global governance. I call for a more compressive and eclectic approach that understands China as a proactive participant in international affairs.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
172072
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Since the early 2000s, crises on the Korean Peninsula have prompted Chinese intellectuals and policy elites into fierce debates about Beijing’s North Korea policy. This study first provides an overview of those testy exchanges and then delves into the contestations about the bilateral relationship as well as the underlying assumptions beneath. On the question of identification, the Chinese are torn between characterizing North Korea as an ally or just as a neighbourly friend. On the question of whether its usefulness justifies continued Chinese support, the debates have revolved around North Korea as a geopolitical buffer, even though the strategic underpinnings are questionable. In both cases the mainstream views are fraught with contradictions and inconsistencies, which will certainly continue to hobble China’s North Korea policy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
181915
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article aims to provide a first-cut analysis of the causes of the initial COVID-19 outbreak as well as the subsequent political contestations in which the masses ended up rallying behind the party-state. While the Wuhan fiasco had everything to do with entrenched pathologies of the bureaucratic state, after Beijing took central command of the broader campaign its overriding priority was to contain the virus with a goal toward salvaging its legitimacy at home. To that end, Beijing unleashed its warrior diplomats to aggressively defend its handling of the pandemic, even to the detriment of its international image. Nevertheless, the strategy worked because the nationalist and populist backlash against the regime’s foreign and domestic critics helped turn the public opinion around in its favor.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
171199
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Ample evidence exists that China was caught off guard by the Trump administration's onslaught of punishing acts—the trade war being a prime, but far from the only, example. This article, in addition to contextualizing their earlier optimism about the relations with the United States under President Trump, examines why Chinese leaders and analysts were surprised by the turn of events. It argues that three main factors contributed to the lapse of judgment. First, Chinese officials and analysts grossly misunderstood Donald Trump the individual. By overemphasizing his pragmatism while downplaying his unpredictability, they ended up underprepared for the policies he unleashed. Second, some ingrained Chinese beliefs, manifested in the analogies of the pendulum swing and the ‘bickering couple’, as well as the narrative of the ‘ballast’, lulled officials and scholars into undue optimism about the stability of the broader relationship. Third, analytical and methodological problems as well as political considerations prevented them from fully grasping the strategic shift against China in the US.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
167997
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
“The feud not only has precipitated an economic decoupling of the United States and China, but also has pushed the overall bilateral relationship to its lowest point in half a century.”
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
177884
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
No amount of sugarcoating can downplay the current depth and scope of stress in Sino-US relations. Clashes routinely run the gamut between Beijing’s handling of Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan; its industrial policies and trade practices; and its relations with third countries such as Iran. Unfortunately for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the drastic downturn of its relations with the United States has also coincided with the ongoing spats with a bevy of countries, not least the first flashes of violence in decades on the border with India. Coupled with the fallout from the COVID-19 fiasco, China is facing arguably its worst geostrategic and diplomatic environment since the 1970s.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|