|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
151419
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines Chinese-led regional forums in the developing world where the Chinese preponderance of economic power is self-evident, its financial largesse is readily utilised to sustain these endeavours, its bureaucracies are empowered to guide the conduct of institutional activities, and its normative intentions and interests are given fullest expression.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
151412
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
China’s pursuit of rapid growth has gone hand-in-hand with the development and elaboration of a stability maintenance regime. If there is a China model, then a key element of that model is the stability maintenance regime. This article traces the origins and evolution of the multiple institutions that make up this regime and reveals a confluence of technocratic leadership and organizational factors that have shaped the character and dynamics of this regime, including its intensification in the 2000s.
As successive leaders of the regime have turned to seemingly rigorous mechanisms of measurement, discipline and control to curb petitions, reduce crime or improve court efficiency, all in the name of preserving stability, they also sowed the seeds of various forms of excesses. There have been efforts to address some of the most glaring abuses in recent years but the regime continues in the era of Xi Jinping, torn between a strong preoccupation with stability and a desire to promote law-based governance.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
151415
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The first two years of the Xi Jinping administration saw a thorough reconfiguration of Internet governance. This reconfiguration created a centralized and integrated institutional framework for information technologies, in support of an ambitious agenda to place digital technologies at the heart of propaganda, public opinion and social control work. Conversely, the autonomy and spontaneity of China’s online sphere was vastly reduced, as the leadership closed channels for public deliberation. This article reviews the institutional and regulatory changes that have taken place between 2012 and 2014, and analyses the methods and purposes of control they imply.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
151411
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
China’s economic success derives from the co-evolution of the political and economic systems. There is no single ‘China model’. Rather, three successive generations of China model can be identified, corresponding to ‘growth equilibria’ that emerged when policy responded effectively to specific economic challenges. The structure of interaction between economic and political is determined by the basic governance strategy of the Chinese Communist Party.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
151414
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Xi Jinping era version of a China model of development continues law’s reform-era roles of generally market-oriented development (under newly challenging conditions), checking development-challenging threats (amid increased concerns over corruption) and reducing pressure for political change (at a time of intolerance toward dissent). The Xi-era version of law appears to be more ‘legalist’ (than its predecessor), still ‘reformist-developmentalist’ and more ‘Leninist’. The Xi-era project for law remains narrowly instrumentalist, uneven across subject matter and region, and beset by both ‘supply-side’ and ‘demand-side’ challenges.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
151417
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The origins and role of the concepts of peaceful coexistence and active defense in Chinese foreign policy are investigated and applied to China’s policy toward the Diaoyu/Senkakus. The dominant moderate conceptual strategic thinking encourages Beijing to aim for the establishment of a modus vivendi with Washington and Tokyo that involves a de facto presence of China alongside both the US and Japan. However, Beijing’s signaling is complicated by radical voices that undercut coexistence.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
151413
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article proposes that advocates of the China model deploy notions of culture and tradition in ways that hide the central role of militarism in Chinese politics. The hypothesis is explored by looking at the ways in which the country’s military and paramilitary institutions are used to propagate militaristic values and practices through the policies of National Defense Education (NDE) and National Defense Mobilization (NDM). This yields evidence from policy documents, the discussions of educationalists and the content of teaching materials. The conclusion is that focusing on the role of militarism provides better insights into the way that social stability and political continuity are maintained than resorting to vague notions of ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ in the China model.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
151418
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Through which mechanisms do officials in rural areas in China reach the higher cadre positions in government bureaucracies? Literature on career advancement variously points to the relevance of human capital, social capital and political loyalty, but does not provide unambiguous answers as to which type of capital plays which role in the mobility of government officials. Adopting social network analysis, the authors conducted fieldwork in a township in northeast China, and obtained overwhelming evidence of the crucial importance of the ‘strong ties’ variety of social capital (real and fictive kinship relations) for recruitment and promotion at the township level. More specifically, for the highest positions both human and social capital are required, for medium-level functions social capital alone is enough. Those who are successful and have primarily social capital acquire human capital through obtaining or buying university degrees. Likewise, tokens of political loyalty can be purchased whenever required for entering relevant administrative positions. Those who initially have only human capital will rapidly need to acquire social capital by developing fictive kinship relations if they wish to make steps in their careers.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
151416
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines Chinese perspectives of, and support for propaganda, relying on television public service advertisements as a means of tapping into citizens’ beliefs. Through the analysis of data from focus groups conducted in Beijing and public opinion survey data from 30 cities, this study argues that Chinese people are generally supportive of state efforts to guide public attitudes through television advertisements, although levels of support vary by age, education and gender. The study suggests that considerable popular support for state propaganda contributes to the regime’s capacity to guide public opinion and helps to explain the persistence of popular support for authoritarian rule.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
151410
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The China model debate has come in three waves since the early 2000s and focused on the role of the state as an organizing force to lead China’s modernization. Revisiting the debate, this article argues that while the alluring story of China’s high growth blinded its dark side for a long time, the economic downturn after 2015 is nothing more than an expedient time for Chinese leaders not only to transform China’s growth model from export and investment-driven to qualitative internal development, but also to build institutional checks on the state authority and to hold the state accountable. If China is able to complete the transition on both fronts, the China model will stand, but a sustained downturn or a lost decade or two could declare the end of the China model.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|