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ID: 158847

Do hawks and doves deliver? the words and deeds of foreign policy in democracies / Heffington, Colton

Heffington, Colton	Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract

What are the domestic determinants of international conflict? I employ elements of salience theory to build an issue emphasis approach to foreign policy. I argue that parties and candidates in democracies credibly signal their foreign policy position prior to their election and that leaders live up to their foreign policy position. Significant research explains how both the behavior of other states and domestic political institutions may constrain leaders, so there are reasons to doubt leaders may be able to match deeds with words. Some scholars have integrated measurements of partisanship into their theoretical explanations, but extant scholarship has not effectively introduced the foreign policy position of the executive into the equation. Using this approach, we can connect competing foreign policy platforms to conflict behavior in a new way. I estimate initiation of militarized interstate disputes by democracies from 1951–2000 in the empirical test, and the results provide support for the hypothesis.

Key Words

Democracy ; Foreign Policy

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ID: 152719

Marked targets: coercive diplomacy and domestic terrorism / Heffington, Colton

Heffington, Colton	Journal Article
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How do sanctions affect the dynamics of political violence in target states? More specifically, how might sanctions affect domestic terrorism in these states? The literature on the consequences of sanctions in target states is rich, yet there has been limited research on how sanctions affect terrorism in target states. In this article, I argue that economic deprivation associated with costly sanctions makes recruiting and carrying out attacks easier for domestic terrorist organizations. Building on work that examines the consequences of sanctions and the economic roots of terrorism, I suggest that sanctions impose economic hardship on regular citizens, who are then more likely to turn to anti-government violence. The result is that the pool from which terrorist groups recruit is broadened during sanctions. I test this argument quantitatively and find support for the hypothesis that costly sanctions lead to higher levels of domestic terrorism.

Key Words

Terrorism ; Sanctions ; Relative Deprivation

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