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SWING STATES (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   152975


Foreign policy activism in Saudi Arabia and Oman. diverging narratives and stances towards the Syrian and Yemeni conflicts / Colombo, Silvia   Journal Article
Colombo, Silvia Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Amid growing animosity and security concerns in the Middle East, the Gulf region appears to be on the way to becoming the new centre of gravity of regional equilibria. The increasingly active foreign policy postures of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries is a key aspect of the new regional order in the making. Saudi Arabia and Oman are two examples of this trend. Their involvement in the Syrian and Yemeni conflicts reveals important differences regarding the aims, narratives, political and military postures, strategies and alliances pursued by Riyadh and Muscat and casts a shadow over the future of GCC cooperation and integration.
Key Words GCC  ;  Oman  ;  Saudi Arabia  ;  Middle Eastern Conflicts  ;  Omnibalancing  ;  Swing States 
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2
ID:   185673


Sanctioning the Homeland: Diasporas’ Influence on American Economic Sanctions Policy / Kustra, Tyler   Journal Article
Kustra, Tyler Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Why do some immigrant groups succeed in influencing the U.S. government to impose economic sanctions on their former dictators, while others do not? This paper begins by noting that the president is the pivotal player in sanctions policy and that presidents cater to voters in swing states. Therefore, a diaspora’s proportion of the swing-state electorate should determine whether the American government imposes sanctions on their former homeland. Considering dictatorships from 1946 to 2005, this paper finds that a one-percentage-point increase in the diaspora’s proportion of the swing-state electorate increases the probability of regime-change sanctions by 11 percentage points. It then calculates causal estimates of the effectiveness of these sanctions on regime change. Using the diaspora’s proportion of the swing-state electorate as an instrumental variable for the presence of economic sanctions, it finds that sanctions do not have a positive, statistically-significant impact on regime change while a negative impact is plausible.
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