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SÖRENSON, KARL
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
153062
Comparable deterrence – target, criteria and purpose
/ Sörenson, Karl
Sörenson, Karl
Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract
The last decade has seen several advances in the study of deterrence. These advances have sparked some strong disagreements regarding interpretation of the models and what their contributions signify. This paper appraises the discussions from a model theoretic perspective. It is argued that when comparing rivalling models three aspects; (i) target, (ii) criteria and (iii) type of purpose should be taken into account in order to make a proper appraisal. Informed by these aspects it is evident that the three deterrence models analysed address different aspects, in different ways and to different ends. From this perspective, the so-called Perfect Deterrence model must be recognised as a clear advancement in the research field. Model comparison will always be context relative and a plurality of models should be viewed favourably.
Key Words
Deterrence
;
International Security
;
Game Theory
;
Theory of Science
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2
ID:
195346
Prospects of Deterrence: Deterrence Theory, Representation and Evidence
/ Sörenson, Karl
Sörenson, Karl
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract
Game theoretic analysis of deterrence has been criticized for not capturing how actors realistically behave. It is alleged that prospect theoretical re-modeling provides a better foundation for a deterrence theory. The article analyzes how the strategies change when a prospect theoretical function is applied to a central deterrence game. While the probability distributions changes, it cannot alter the general dynamics. When considered together with previous research, it shows that prospect theory neither can or should replace standard assumptions when constructing a deterrence theory. However, viewed as a compliment, prospect theory expands the modeling possibilities and opens up for important new aspects.
Key Words
Game Theory
;
Prospect Theory
;
Deterrence Theory
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