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ID:
153390
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| Summary/Abstract |
Xi Jinping swiftly centralized political power shortly after the 18th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) National Congress in 2012, opposing what was predicted when he was elected general secretary. This action also compromises China’s long-term efforts to avert an over-concentration of power among a few elites. This study deals with Xi’s strong ascent to power, defined as the result of institutional change in China’s political power game from the perspective of new institutionalism. The author identifies triggers of institutional change, ideas and norms introduced for changing informal institutions, and the actual transformation of formal institutions, arguing that Xi took advantage of social demand for reform coordination as well as some top elites’ serious political misbehavior to commence institutional change for the centralization of political power. To do so, Xi introduced new reform ideas – systemic thinking and top-down design, originating from complex systems theory – in the name of coordinating and comprehensively deepening reform. Xi eventually succeeded in justifying the centralization of power and the establishment of central organizations to deepen reforms comprehensively and coordinate internal and external security. As a result, Xi seized power while practically nullifying the principle of division of work.
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| 2 |
ID:
159915
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ‘with-Chinese-characteristics’ discourse proclaims its superiority in reflecting people’s genuine needs without poisonous partisan politics, as in Western democracies. The Party’s consultative democracy, as represented by its allies in forums including the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, is key to this superiority. Consequently, the organizer of these inputs, the United Front Work Department (UFWD), is a key element of CCP legitimacy as its organizer of representation of the increasing number of non-Party social forces. This ostensible alliance allows the Party to proclaim itself as the representative of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. Nevertheless, little recent work has been done on either this consultation or the Department. Through the processes of legitimation and de-legitimation, this article decodes how this consultative process works by examining the UFWD’s methods in relation to religious believers. Under Xi Jinping, united front work is again being prioritized and is closely tied to his reform plans.
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