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ID:
188300
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay explores the regional rivalry between Russia and Turkey from the former’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 to its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The main argument is that Russia and Turkey have maintained a managed regional rivalry. The two have continuously supported opposing sides in regional conflict theatres. At the same time, Russia and Turkey have learned to accommodate the interests and spheres of influence of each other and cooperate through various bilateral mechanisms. The essay concludes that a form of managed regional rivalry will continue to shape Russian–Turkish relations in Eurasia in the foreseeable future.
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| 2 |
ID:
183903
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russian and Turkish interests have clashed over Syria since the beginning of the conflict in late 2011. Yet, in Summer 2016, the two governments emerged as deal makers in the Syrian conflict. Due to a host of international and regional reasons, Russia and Turkey have enhanced cooperation on the ground in Syria. This article argues that the concept of alignment best captures the various forms of security cooperation taking shape in different regions of the world and is useful to explain Russian-Turkish security cooperation in Syria. It offers a detailed account of the origins and key components of Russian-Turkish geopolitical alignment in Syria. Military coordination and the search for a political settlement have been the salient components of this process. Cooperation in Syria has also had a spillover effect in other sectors. However, the article argues that Russian-Turkish geopolitical alignment is unlikely to transform into a more durable security partnership as the two countries continue to prefer divergent outcomes in Syria. Still, Russian-Turkish geopolitical alignment has significant implications for the regional order in an age of American decline.
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| 3 |
ID:
153435
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study aims to shift the focus of scholarship on ideas and foreign policy from its overwhelming concern with domestic structures and institutional setup toward a greater awareness of the importance of changing national identity conceptions. I argue that Turkey’s foreign policy toward the post-Soviet Turkic Eurasia has been influenced by an ideational factor—the idea of the “Turkic World.” Advocated by nonstate actors, “Turkic World” was rapidly internalized by a wide range of political actors in Turkey in the 1990s. Despite the eventual fading of the geopolitical importance of the region for Turkey and the rise to power of a political party with Islamist roots, the idea has gained a “taken for granted” status in Turkey’s foreign policy interests and practices. I argue that idea entrepreneurs can influence foreign policy when two conditions are met: first, when a critical juncture prompts decision makers to search for a new foreign policy framework and second, when the evolving national identity conceptions of the ruling elite overlap with the general premise of the idea entrepreneurs’ proposals. In this case, “Turkic World” has not only provided Turkish decision makers with a pragmatic foreign policy course but also spoken to their changing “worldviews.”
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