| Summary/Abstract |
Since the conclusion of the Comfort Women Agreement (December 2015) and the
General Security of Military Information Agreement (November 2016), it has been
widely believed that Japan–South Korea relations have hit bottom and begun to
rebound. How soon and how much they will recover depends on the Japanese and
South Koreans themselves. Can the people of Japan and South Korea escape the
fetters of the past? Can the two countries have as much security cooperation as the
United States desires? This paper argues that the recent development in Japan–ROK
relations provides little hope that the two countries will be freed from their historical
yoke as the two governments have wished. Sincere reconciliation on history
between America’s two essential Asian allies will be impossible for several decades
because domestic politics in both countries rewards nationalistic approaches to
Japan–ROK relations. In its policy toward East Asia, the Trump administration will
face the same dilemma as did its predecessors as long as Japan–South Korea history
disputes widen the mismatch in the two countries’ policy priorities toward China
and North Korea, a problem that is beyond U.S. control.
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