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BEHAVIORAL THEORY (3) answer(s).
 
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ID:   162213


Primaries and candidate polarization: behavioral theory and experimental evidence / Woon, Jonathan   Journal Article
Woon, Jonathan Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Do primary elections cause candidates to take extreme, polarized positions? Standard equilibrium analysis predicts full convergence to the median voter’s position with complete information, but behavioral game theory predicts divergence when players are policy-motivated and have out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Theoretically, I show that primary elections can cause greater extremism or moderation, depending on the beliefs candidates and voters have about their opponents. In a controlled incentivized experiment, I find that candidates diverge substantially and that primaries have little effect on average positions. Voters employ a strategy that weeds out candidates who are either too moderate or too extreme, which enhances ideological purity without increasing divergence. The analysis highlights the importance of behavioral assumptions in understanding the effects of electoral institutions.
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2
ID:   171017


Re-appreciation of charlie hitch and his contributions to economics, security, and the management of organizations / Augier, Mie; Marshall, Andrew W   Journal Article
Augier, Mie Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract This paper discusses central ideas in the work of Charles Hitch. He is known for his pioneering contributions to defense economics and ‘systems analysis’ and for his introducing program budgeting in McNamara’s Pentagon. We discuss the evolution of his work and ideas, and how his views on systems analysis were influenced by his broader interest in human and organizational behavior. The paper also emphasizes Hitch’s skills as leader and manager of organizations (in particular as the head of the economics department at RAND).
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3
ID:   153558


Resolve, time, and risk / Kertzer, Joshua D   Journal Article
Kertzer, Joshua D Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Why do some actors in international politics display remarkable persistence in wartime, while others “cut and run” at the first sign of trouble? I offer a behavioral theory of resolve, suggesting that variation in time and risk preferences can help explain why some actors display more resolve than others. I test the theory experimentally in the context of public opinion about military interventions. The results not only help explain why certain types of costs of war loom larger for certain types of actors but also shed light on some of the behavioral revolution's contributions more broadly.
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