| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
181708
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Indo-Pacific has emerged as an important region in international politics where the major powers are deeply engaged in reshaping the security architecture. Over the last few years, India and China have drawn their policies by employing competitive strategies that strengthen as well as neutralise their respective power positions in the Indian Ocean Region, particularly in South Asia and the South China Sea. China's “String of Pearls” strategy and the “Belt and Road Initiative” undermine India's influence in the Indian Ocean Region, where the changing geo-economic and geostrategic imperatives pose threat to its interests. This mounts pressure on New Delhi to respond by pursuing counter-strategies to secure its interests in the Indo-Pacific region. The article further explains how India and the United States’ interests are converging against an assertive China in the Indo-Pacific and how the two states’ security and maritime collaborations are balancing their common rival by maintaining a favourable status quo in the region.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
189286
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The author, viewing a "cold war" as a form of the establishment of a new world order, examines Germany's approach to involvement in the US-China confrontation and the establishment of a German military presence in the Asia-Pacific region as part of the country's attempts to become a global power. The author stresses Germany's reluctance to participate in the "containment" of the PRC from 2014 to 2019 and presents reasons for it, including the cold war between the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia. The author identifies a group of factors that prompted Germany to transition to an accelerated scenario of introducing a military presence in the Far East in 2020 and 2021. Those factors are the rapid withdrawal of the Bundeswehr from Afghanistan, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the election of Joe Biden as US president. Starting in February and March 2021, Germany contributed to pressure on China, but strictly limited its volume and degree. This paper examines the trends and manifestations of the German shift to advanced security and defense cooperation with Singapore and Japan in the late 2010s and early 2020s. The creation of AUKUS (September 15,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
153837
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the transformation in Indo-US relations in the first two years of the Modi government. It first discusses the state of Indo-US relations before Modi's ascent to the premiership in May 2014. The challenges confronting the relationship were not strictly bilateral; Modi's image and its historical baggage had also made them personal. Subsequently, the article elaborates on the significant progress made in the bilateral relationship during the first two years of the Modi government. The concluding section explains the rationale behind Modi's outreach to the United States. Three factors appear to have had a significant influence: a conviction that India's developmental priorities cannot be met without substantive cooperation with the US; the strong political authority Modi enjoys within his own party and in the Indian parliament; and the structural changes in India's security environment brought about by an aggressive China and its growing strategic convergence with Pakistan, leading to a re-think on ‘non-alignment’ as a guiding principle of foreign policy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
160484
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The US–Japan alliance has been one of the most important elements in configuring Japanese diplomacy since World War II. Accordingly, Japan’s relations with Iran always require striking a delicate balance among Japan’s security policy based on the US–Japan alliance, its energy demands, and its historically good bilateral relations with Iran. Japan welcomed the nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 group of nations in 2015. Iran holds the world’s second largest natural gas reserves and ranks fourth in proven crude oil reserves. Japanese companies were eager to re-enter the Iranian market with its rich natural resources and over 80 million strong population. However, the inauguration of President Trump in January 2017 and his antagonistic stance toward Iran has slowed this move. The Japanese government has taken the initiative to improve relations with Iran after lifting its sanctions against that country, while trying to mitigate possible risks. This article aims to examine relations between Iran and Japan after the Iran nuclear deal from three aspects: economic relations, nuclear cooperation, and security.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
163624
|
|
|