| Summary/Abstract |
When the George W Bush administration announced the ‘freedom agenda’ in the Middle East, officials claimed it marked a major break in United States (US) foreign policy. In 2005, the administration intensified efforts pressuring Egypt, a client state, to democratize. However, the US continued pursuing security cooperation with and providing military aid to Egypt. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak repelled US reform efforts by exploiting the normative inconsistency between democratization and security in the war on terror. This paper reviews Mubarak's ‘balking’ strategy (Stephen Walt, Taming American power, New York: WW Norton, 2005), including feigning compliance through nominal legal changes and counter-arguments to buy time until the inconsistencies in US policy came to a head. By 2006, the US had abandoned the freedom agenda and the Egyptian regime had embarked on a repression campaign. As I argue, the implications of the contradictions in US policy towards Egypt demonstrate that weaker client states may enjoy increased agency vis-à-vis a weakly committed patron hegemon.
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