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| 1 |
ID:
154854
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the 1987 democratic reform, regional attitudes toward the two southern provinces have been regarded as the most significant determinant of South Korean voters’ political preferences. In recent years, however, many scholars have speculated that regional animus is losing its ground as a basis for political judgment and will eventually be replaced by other politically relevant factors such as political ideology and issue preference. Others raise questions about the validity of this kind of “revisionist” argument, noting that election outcomes remain regionally divided. Adopting the implicit association test (IAT) as a measure of regional attitudes, we provide an empirical test to measure the effects of the emergence of new generations and geographical mobility in South Korean voters’ regional attitudes. Our results show that younger Korean voters are less regionally biased toward either of the two southern provinces. The only exception was the younger generation in the Honam region: they held even higher levels of animus toward Yeongnam than their older counterparts. Geographical mobility also seems to decrease regional bias. Those who have relocated to other provinces showed less regional bias when compared with the natives of Yeongnam and Honam still residing in their respective regions. Likewise, our results show that the inter-generational transfer of regional animus is not overwhelming. For the descendants of Yeongnam or Honam natives residing in another province, their family’s region of origin mattered little. In short, our findings suggest that changing generational composition and geographical mobility are likely to lessen the severity of regional animus and the political significance of regional attitudes will wane.
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| 2 |
ID:
158691
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| Summary/Abstract |
Do foreign policy elites who shared formative political experiences also share similar views on subsequent policy issues? Proponents of a generation effect suggest that they do, but this argument overlooks two facts: (1) not everyone experiences major historical events in the same way and (2) different experiences might give rise to quite different policy views. Here we investigate the impact of the Vietnam War on elite opinion about foreign policy during the following two decades using elite surveys conducted by the Foreign Policy Leadership Project (FPLP) from 1976 through 1996, assessing their susceptibility to what has been called the Vietnam Syndrome. Not surprisingly, we find that age and military service influenced elite opinion about the Vietnam War. More importantly, we find that different trajectories of opinion about the Vietnam War influenced later views about a wide range of foreign policy issues during the Cold War, even after controlling for party identification and ideology. However, we see little evidence that these effects persisted after the end of the Cold War. This finding holds even on matters like civil war intervention, for which we might expect the experience of the Vietnam War to remain relevant. Our analysis suggests that the Vietnam Syndrome is restricted to matters involving Cold War rivalry.
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