| Summary/Abstract |
Power Transition Theory (PTT) has hitherto often relied on power indicators like Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) to capture its power variable. The underlying assumption is that these indicators are highly correlated, and thus it matters little as to which one the researcher chooses. I call this PTT's power consensus and argue that this consensus is problematic, as the choice of power indicator is often crucial. For PTT, it does not only matter whether such indicators come to similar results by and large; the position of certain singular actors—such as the dominant power, its prime challengers, and the top ranked great powers generally—is even more essential. However, it is precisely with regard to the positions of these actors that we find important discrepancies between what PTT's favored indicators (GDP and CINC) suggest. Analysis of some crucial historical and recent cases supports my challenge to the power consensus. First, the celebrated peaceful power transition between the United Kingdom and the United States in the nineteenth century becomes suspect under closer scrutiny, as GDP places the United States entering the parity zone at a time during which it must arguably be counted as a dissatisfied power. Second, a number of CINC-exclusive power transitions in the twentieth century are not accounted for by GDP. A few possible options might mitigate the power-problem for the cases under scrutiny, however scholars of PTT should generally be much more conscious about their choice of power indicator.
|