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ID:
188890
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Summary/Abstract |
In “Cyber Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-Escalation of International Crises,” Erica D. Lonergan and Shawn W. Lonergan develop a theory of accommodative signaling that focuses on states seeking to de-escalate a crisis while simultaneously satisfying a nationalistic constituency. They test their claims against five case studies, arguing that all support their theory. But for various reasons, none do. In the cases where they claim cyber operations are used for accommodative signaling, there is compelling evidence that the operations are coercive tactics employed as part of a coercive strategy. In the case where they claim a cyber operation was a coercive signal, the covert operations scholarship used to build their theory would conclude that the operation was an accommodative signal or was not primarily intended to send a signal.
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2 |
ID:
155276
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Summary/Abstract |
U.S. national cybersecurity strategy, to be effective must align with the structural features and operational characteristics of the domain. Yet, this article contends that the current U.S. strategy of deterrence, coupled with the establishment of norms in cyberspace, does not satisfy this requirement. Alternatively, a strategy of cyber persistence is proposed, one that is enabled rather than crippled by the uniqueness of cyberspace. In an environment of constant contact, a strategy grounded in persistent engagement is more appropriate than one of operational restraint and reaction for shaping the parameters of acceptable behavior and sustaining and advancing U.S. national interests.
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