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| 1 |
ID:
164668
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| Summary/Abstract |
What drives Russia's Baltic policy? To answer this question, I develop a neoclassical realist framework that explains how local great powers act toward neighboring small states. In brief, the framework argues that local great powers face strong systemic incentives to establish a sphere of influence around their borders. Toward that end, they can employ positive and negative incentives. The general rule is that the higher the level of external pressure, the more assertive the policies pursued by the local great power. However, this simple relationship between external pressure and regional assertiveness is moderated by two variables: (1) the ability of small states to obtain security guarantees from extra regional powers; and (2) the level of state capacity of the local great power. The article develops this theoretical argument and shows that it goes a long way to explain the overall pattern and evolution of Russia's Baltic policy over the last two decades.
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| 2 |
ID:
188294
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has caused a massive humanitarian crisis. As of this writing, thousands of people have lost their lives, and many more seem destined to die. Moreover, nearly 2.5 million Ukrainians have fled their country, a number that will grow considerably if the war continues. Beyond the human suffering and misery it entails, the conflict has shaken the foundations of Europe’s security order. Western governments have scrambled to ramp up their defensive expenditures, imposed severe economic and political sanctions on Russia, and upped their supply of weapons to Ukraine. The Kremlin, in turn, has shown no signs of backing down. On the contrary, the Putin government has issued thinly veiled nuclear threats and warned Western leaders not to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine. Though it is still too early to know how the conflict will end, it is already clear that Europe will not be the same after the war. How could this happen?
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| 3 |
ID:
175626
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper shows that, during 1991–1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration settled to pursue NATO enlargement in order to ensure both stability in and influence over Europe. Both were necessary subsidiary objectives towards achieving long-term security aims and the medium-term goal of furthering American prosperity. Bush officials concluded that European instability, protectionism, and self-absorption could menace US-led economic globalization. Anchoring NATO at the centre of the post-Cold War European order was seen as the best available response. NATO enlargement would alleviate European security concerns; prevent the emergence of regional security structures that endangered the Alliance; and provide the leverage Washington needed to encourage European participation in America’s global economic order.
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| 4 |
ID:
179884
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| Summary/Abstract |
Michael McFaul's article “Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy” is well timed and likely to play a big role in shaping the debate about contemporary Russian foreign policy.1 The core argument is straightforward: President Vladimir Putin's illiberal worldviews are a major driver of Russia's international behavior. To be clear, McFaul acknowledges that other factors influence Russian behavior as well. In particular, he stresses that the balance of power enables Putin to pursue a confrontational foreign policy, but the balance of power does not motivate or cause his actions (pp. 102–105). Similarly, Russia's increasingly authoritarian political system serves as a permissive condition, concentrating decisionmaking authority in the hands of Putin (pp. 114–117). Thus, while McFaul recognizes that power and regime-type variables affect Russia's international behavior, the heavy causal lifting is done by Putin's illiberal conservatism and anti-Western mindset.
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| 5 |
ID:
155319
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| Summary/Abstract |
Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and meddling in eastern Ukraine are the latest signs of Russia’s increasingly assertive behavior in the post-Soviet space. Not surprisingly, Moscow’s actions have become the source of much debate. This article maps the fast-growing literature on the subject and assesses four types of explanations: (1) decision-maker explanations focusing on Putin’s personality traits and worldviews; (2) domestic political accounts emphasizing the Kremlin’s efforts to deflect attention from internal failures; (3) ideational accounts explaining Russia’s near abroad assertion with reference to its national identity and desire for international status; and (4) geopolitical accounts highlighting power and security considerations. The article shows that each approach offers some valuable insights but fails to provide a convincing stand-alone explanation. It is argued that to overcome the identified shortcomings, scholars need to devote more attention to building synthetic accounts. A theoretical model is outlined that specifies how geopolitical pressures, ideas, domestic political conditions, and decision-maker influences interact in shaping Russia’s near abroad policy.
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| 6 |
ID:
188303
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay complements the other contributions to this special issue by placing Russia’s neighbourhood policy into a broader temporal and theoretical perspective. It shows that Russia’s political elite during the last three decades has been largely united behind the goal of establishing a Moscow-centred regional security order. Yet, despite this broad-based consensus, Russia’s policy in the former Soviet area has varied markedly across time and space. To account for this pattern, the essay develops and tests a neoclassical realist approach that explains why, how and when major powers such as Russia pursue regional primacy.
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| 7 |
ID:
186558
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores Russia’s attack on Ukraine using the lens of strategic culture. Specifically, two strands in Russian strategic culture are identified. The first is a deep-seated sense of vulnerability, especially vis-à-vis “the West.” To counter this perceived threat, Russia’s national security establishment has long emphasized the importance of possessing strategic depth and buffer zones. The second strand revolves around a feeling of entitlement to great power status. A central component in Russia’s great power vision is the right to have a sphere of influence in its Eurasian neighborhood. The article shows that Kremlin officials perceived Ukraine’s drift toward the West as a major threat to both Russia’s security interests and its status aspirations. As a result, Russia’s rhetorical milieu regarding Ukraine became increasingly radicalized. The article concludes that this provided the discursive and intellectual habitat that enabled Putin to launch a large-scale attack.
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