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| 1 |
ID:
179809
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's global proliferation of psychological warfare, operating in small signatures and low visibility, reflects a cultural continuity of ancient strategic thought and martial philosophy. Contemporary analysis explains how China's attempts to coerce and persuade its target entities work through systematic deception and perception management to achieve its authoritarian objectives. However, there are gaps in the understanding of these operations as distinct from conventional statecraft, and in the configuration and mechanism of actions constituting bottom-up change toward subduing the enemy without fighting. To guide the analysis of China's psychological warfare in an organized manner, an explanatory framework of three cultural drivers—allusion (anshi), reasoning (douzhi) and luring (yinyou)—and six tactics—induction (youdao), coercion (xiepo), sentiment (qinggan), hoax (xirao), persuasion (ganhua) and disguise (qiaozhuang)—were devised. It is argued that the deeply rooted ideational and materially embodied dynamics continue to exploit western social vulnerabilities and the open nature of democratic institutions by introducing policy confusion, assimilation and division. However, failing to recognise these as normative social practices will result in misguided counter-measures aimed at transforming the communist system into a capitalist democracy, triggering domestic social unrest, or discrediting the CCP leadership in the eyes of the world and the Chinese people.
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| 2 |
ID:
170400
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| Summary/Abstract |
Many studies have explored the importance of public opinion in British foreign policy decision-making, especially when it comes to the UK's relations with the United States and the European Union. Despite its importance, there is a dearth of research on public opinion about British foreign policy towards other major players in the international system, such as emerging powers like China. We have addressed this knowledge gap by conducting a public opinion survey in the UK after the Brexit referendum. Our research findings indicate that the British public at large finds China's rise disconcerting, but is also pragmatic in its understanding of how the ensuing bilateral relations should be managed. More importantly, our results show that views on China are clearly split between the two opposing Brexit identities. Those who subscribe strongly to the Leave identity, measured by their aversion to the EU and antipathy towards immigration, are also more likely to hold negative perceptions of Chinese global leadership and be more suspicious of China as a military threat. In contrast, those who espouse a Remain identity—that is, believe that Britain would be better served within the EU and with more immigrants—are more likely to prefer closer engagement with China and to have a more positive outlook overall on China's place within the global community.
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| 3 |
ID:
161716
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| Summary/Abstract |
The existing liberal hegemonic order is essentially an American-led and western-centred one. Its desirability and sustainability have been called into questions due to a wide array of challenges and developments. The rise of China is both one of the drivers of change as well as a key determinant shaping the emerging order. This article discusses what China's vision for a future international order looks like, what kind of impact China is likely to have on this order and how this will happen. By examining the ideas, concepts and practices which inform China's vision for the future, it argues that China will search for a liberal partnership order composed of an open economic order, a relatively more equal political order and a cooperative security order. To advance this goal, China will aim to preserve or even expand the liberal features of the prevailing order while curtailing its hegemonic nature. Instead of attempting to overturn the current order, China would pursue selective and incremental adjustments that overtime will lead to an order transition. Given current constraints, China cannot shape the emerging order in the same way as the United States did in the post-Second World War period, and the form and tempo of the order transition will depend largely on the outcome of Sino-US bargaining.
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| 4 |
ID:
155476
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This article uses recursivity theory to examine the emerging nature and position of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) from four different perspectives. Part one describes important domestic drivers within China providing motives for the AIIB initiative. These include domestic overinvestment in infrastructure and construction, combined with environmental stresses compelling the shift towards a more sustainable economy. Part two examines regional networks and linkages that the AIIB is becoming part of. These include China's ‘one belt, one road’ initiative, and various collective initiatives based around ASEAN. In part three, this article explores the AIIB's appearance on the development finance scene as an example of ‘contested multilateralism’—where a new multilateral institution emerges to challenge the rules and practices of existing institutions. The AIIB has entered into co-financing agreements with many of its multilateral development bank peers. Its standards and procedures are strongly influenced by existing ones, even while it begins to influence the practices of its partner multilateral development banks. Part four examines the potential influence of a future alliance between the AIIB and the UNCCC's Green Climate Fund. Such an alliance would require an even greater degree of compliance by the AIIB with global standards of transparency and good governance, as well as expanding the scope for the AIIB to influence regional climate change adaptation and mitigation infrastructure initiatives.
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| 5 |
ID:
168425
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this article, we examine China's promotion of the renminbi (RMB) in international oil trade and explore its implications for the international currency system in the short and the long term. The article traces the rise of the RMB in international oil trade in recent years and provides an analysis of its impact on the internationalization of the Chinese currency. We argue that despite the increasing use of the yuan in oil trade in recent years, in the short term it is highly unlikely that a petro-RMB system will emerge to rival the petrodollar system. Unlike the petrodollar, which combines the qualities of a master currency, a top currency and a negotiated currency, China lacks the economic leadership and the political and geopolitical leverages to make the RMB a major petrocurrency. Although the emergence of the RMB-denominated Shanghai oil futures is an important development, the absence of highly developed financial markets and a strong legal system in China hinders its potential. In the long run, the RMB may take on a more prominent role in the international oil trade as China's weight as an oil importer rises. More importantly, the overuse of financial sanctions by the US government has begun to undermine the role of the dollar within and beyond the oil trade. In addition, the rise of alternative energy sources will diminish the centrality of oil in the world economy, thus reducing the significance of petrocurrencies—whether the dollar or the RMB—in shaping the international currency system.
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| 6 |
ID:
165034
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| Summary/Abstract |
Power is shifting from the West to the East. Asia is experiencing the initial throes of this shift, where the key protagonists are the United States, the established power or hegemon, and China, the rising challenger and peer competitor. This article argues that the ongoing geopolitical competition between the United States and China is best viewed as a competition over the hierarchy of prestige, with China seeking to replace the US as the most prestigious state in the international system within the next thirty years. Although the competition is a global one, with China having made significant economic–political inroads into Africa, Latin America and even Europe, Asia is where China must establish its prestige or ‘reputation for power’ in the first instance. China seeks the top seat in the hierarchy of prestige, and the US will do everything in its power to maintain its pole position, because the state with the greatest reputation for power gets to govern the region: it will attract more followers, regional powers will defer to and accommodate it, and it will play a decisive role in shaping the rules and institutions of international relations. In a word, the state at the top of the prestige hierarchy gets to translate its power into the political outcomes it desires with minimal resistance and maximum flexibility.
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| 7 |
ID:
165035
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the century since the signature of the Treaty of Versailles, China's international status and material condition have been fundamentally transformed. The People's Republic has become powerful in ways that probably would have astonished the leaders of the early Republic of China, first established in 1911. These changes do not mean, however, that there are not potent legacies from China's nineteenth-century and Versailles-era experiences. In particular, the Versailles agreement showed China that gaining full membership of the international society of states would not be easy, despite its having joined the Allied side in the war effort. China's failure to gain either restitution of the territory of Shandong or proper acknowledgement of its status as a legally sovereign state added to the Chinese distrust of the West and Japan born out of their exploitative activities in China. The subsequent May Fourth nationalist demonstration of 1919 was the first of many prominent displays of nationalist outrage, a sentiment that provided opportunities for exploitation by successive Chinese governments. The article shows how the trials associated with removing China's unequal status in international politics condition and, in some respects, deform Chinese attitudes towards international politics to this day. In particular, it asks why China's remarkable resurgence has not changed official Chinese perceptions of world order, the tenor of its relations with other states and its view of its own place in international society more fundamentally than has in fact been the case.
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