| Summary/Abstract |
Most studies of policy interdependence try to observe international policy networks by focusing on the diffusion of a specific policy across countries. Thus, if that policy is not adopted from one country to the next, researchers usually treat that as a sign of weak interdependence and the lack of diffusion. In this article, we challenge the notion that diffusion processes and interdependence entail the same policy diffusing. National governments usually engage in a bundle of diffusing policies at the same time. We argue that they are often pressed to implement the policy adopted in neighboring countries. But, at the same time, their incentive to implement this policy depends, at least in part, on how much they rely on foreign resources. The greater their dependence, the more likely they are to adopt the policy preferences of foreign constituents. Thus, conditional on a neighbor’s pressure to adopt a policy, states may engage in policy alteration—the adoption of an alternative instrument to an internationally diffusing policy. We claim that such policy substitution is especially likely in countries that are less dependent on economic flows, as their governments enjoy more political leeway to turn policy diffusion processes to their advantage. We trace this mechanism using two studies of the diffusion of alternative environmental policies across space and time.
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