| Summary/Abstract |
The movement of jobs overseas—known as “offshoring”—is one of the most politically charged aspects of globalization in developed countries. The high salience of offshoring reflects growth in competitive pressures from globalization that directly target individuals’ jobs. I argue that, in a world of fragmented production, how vulnerable one’s occupation is to offshoring helps explain patterns of protectionist sentiment not otherwise accounted for by existing work. I expect that the negative consequences of offshoring for workers will be particularly salient. As a result, vulnerability to offshoring is likely to generate protectionist sentiment toward free trade among constituents. Therefore, legislators whose constituents are vulnerable to offshoring should prove more likely to oppose trade liberalization. I measure vulnerability to offshoring at the district level using data from the US Census. I analyze roll call votes on free trade in the House of Representatives between 2001 and 2006. I find that the larger the share of their constituents who are vulnerable to offshoring, the more likely legislators are to vote against free trade and to discuss the costs of trade for workers in floor debates. My results suggest that the dynamics of offshoring constitute an overlooked dimension to the political economy of trade.
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