| Summary/Abstract |
American nuclear diplomacy generally presents a set of explanatory conditions ripe for the political realist: rogue states, an alarmed public, and existential risk create a milieu apt for realpolitik. This case study closely examines the link between the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the theoretical trends in United States foreign policy, specifically with respect to the dictates of neorealism. At the time of writing, the bulk of literature on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and its consequent developments remains lacking in theoretical commentary on how the agreement relates to broader narratives of United States foreign policy. This essay bridges the gap in the literature by drawing a connection between the Iran nuclear deal, neorealism, and liberal institutionalism. The findings suggest that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action marks a significant deviation from the predictions of realism, instead acting as an example of liberal institutionalism and potentially signalling a greater shift toward multilateralism in United States foreign policy.
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