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| 1 |
ID:
169460
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article traces and analyzes the development of South Korea’s first ballistic-missile system from 1971 through 1978 based on memoirs and personal accounts by scientists and officials directly involved in missile development during this time. The system is often described as a reverse-engineered copy of the Nike Hercules, a US surface-to-air missile, but this description does not capture the true character of South Korean missile development during the 1970s. By working on the Nike Hercules-based design in cooperation with American and French contractors, South Korea’s weapons specialists gained experience and built facilities that underpinned autonomous missile development for decades afterward. The accounts of South Korean weapons scientists also demonstrate that tacit knowledge—subtle or secret methods and tricks transmitted in person from mentors to protégés rather than written down in textbooks or manuals—can play a crucial role in building successful weapons programs and capable research-and-development capacities.
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| 2 |
ID:
016294
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| Publication |
June 1993.
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| Description |
7-15
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| 3 |
ID:
132479
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The one continent where ballistic missiles have proliferated tremendously is Asia. There are some important factors that have been, and are, contributing to such a trend in the region. Firstly, the demand for the ballistic missile as it is a relatively cheap weapon to develop and deploy compared to a large and sophisticated air force. Also, this weapon is hard to counter even by the most technologically advanced countries. Secondly, the existing geo- political make-up where confrontation is between states that are at opposite poles of the power spectrum, where the weaker side finds such weapons most suitable to counter a technologically superior adversary. Thirdly, the ready availability of the technology and vital components through both legal and clandestine means. These factors have enabled states like North
Korea with a less than meagre technology base to adapt the technology, of course, with tremendous assistance, to develop ballistic missile capability. With the rapid proliferation of these weapons in Asia, countries facing this threat have been looking for ways to counter it. Most have turned to some level of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). This paper attempts to study the ballistic missile threat and the missile defence efforts of the US and its allies in East Asia, China, Israel and India.
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| 4 |
ID:
068406
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| Publication |
Surrey, Jane's Information Group, 2000.
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| Description |
xiv, 241p.
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| Standard Number |
0710621760
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 045015 | 358.17182/SHE 045015 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
120616
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 2000, bold claims have been made about Burma's ambition to acquire weapons of mass destruction, but few observers have asked two critical questions, the answers to which would illuminate this debate and allow for more nuanced analyses. These are: Why might Burma wish to possess nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles? and, How could it use them? A third question that has escaped serious attention is: If Burma did try to acquire WMD, what would be the net security implications for the country? All three relate to the mindset of Burma's military leadership since the 1988 uprising. Examination of these matters leads to another unknown, which is whether the regime's vision is shared by the country's apparently reformist new government.
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| 6 |
ID:
115479
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| 7 |
ID:
086249
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The People's Republic of China (PRC), no longer content with its longstanding 'minimalist' nuclear posture and strategy, is enhancing the striking power and survivability of its theater and strategic missile forces and rethinking its nuclear doctrine in ways that may pose serious challenges for the United States. Although the modernization of Chinese nuclear and missile forces may ultimately result in greater strategic deterrence stability, this change will not come about immediately or automatically. Indeed, it is entirely possible that China's growing missile capabilities could decrease crisis stability under certain circumstances, especially in the event of a US-China conflict over Taiwan.
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| 8 |
ID:
050229
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Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2003.
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| Description |
ix, 252p.
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| Standard Number |
0295982942
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 047562 | 327.1743/MIS 047562 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 9 |
ID:
111046
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| 10 |
ID:
172655
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| Summary/Abstract |
Within the Indo-Pacific reside a number of dynamic and complex regional challenges with worldwide implications, including nuclear powers, disputed territories, ballistic missiles, and highly adaptive adversaries. Countering each of these challenges requires a whole-of-government approach in which the other three instruments of power understand that the military maintains a necessary level of readiness to backstop their combined efforts. Revisiting, in detail, the four NDS challenges in the Indo-Pacific validates this construct.
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| 11 |
ID:
130342
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the U.S. government winds up an interagency review of rules governing the export of large drones, the conflicting goals of nonproliferation and commerce are creating a new test of the 27-year-old Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Observers do not expect big changes to the MTCR, which seeks to prevent the proliferation of unmanned systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The MTCR, a voluntary arrangement that now includes 34 countries, originally was intended to curb the spread of ballistic missiles and unmanned vehicles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. In 1993 it was amended to control systems carrying any weapons of mass destruction. It has become Washington's chief tool for controlling the spread of armed drones. "It's quite unlikely that we will see any radical change in the MTCR," Eric McClafferty, an attorney at Kelley Drye and Warren, a law firm in Washington that represents UAV manufacturers, said in a March 19 interview. "That said, there's a lot of pressure on the U.S. government to liberalize controls to make sure the U.S. doesn't get left behind in this market." The conflict has played out in a series of closed-door meetings over the last two months among the State, Defense, and Commerce departments as officials seek to update U.S. policy toward the burgeoning UAV market. Industry representatives have made their views known via technical committees that advise policymakers in these departments. "It's a pretty contentious fight" between the State Department's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation and the Pentagon's Defense Technology Security Administration, said Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, in a March 17 interview. The State Department says that "if you pull at the thread of MTCR, you will weaken the nonproliferation regime as a whole. The other side says the international market is going to supply these UAVs anyway," Zenko said. The heart of the issue is what kind of UAVs U.S. manufacturers can sell overseas. The MTCR imposes a "presumption of denial" for the export of so-called Category 1 UAV's, which are drones that can travel more than 300 kilometers with a payload of more than 500 kilograms. Drones that do not have those capabilities are classified as Category 2 UAVs and are not subject to such restrictive criteria. Two drones currently classified as Category 1-the Reaper, formerly known as the Predator, and the Global Hawk-have played a central role in U.S. aerial attacks on suspected Islamic militants in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Washington has approved the sale of an armed drone to only one country, the United Kingdom, although unarmed versions of these drones have been sold to Italy and South Korea.
The stakes of the MTCR review process are large politically and economically, observers say.
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| 12 |
ID:
125367
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the not too distant past, the world's most powerful military of the US was poised to mount a short duration campaign to punish Syria for allegedly crossing some undefined 'red line' of employing chemical weapons against insurgent forces opposing the regime in power. Reports coming out of Washington indicated that the US President was not only determined to degrade Syria's chemical weapon capabilities but also to take down Bashar Assad's air force, destroy his air bases and knock out his ground-to-ground ballistic missiles using giant B-52 bombers and B-2 stealth bombers. Some of the bombers were planned to fly in directly from the US, others from a base in Qatar.
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| 13 |
ID:
096323
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| 14 |
ID:
133336
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A ground based interceptor (GBI) missile launched on 22 June 2014, carried the new capability enhancement II Exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) to its first successful intercept of a ballistic target that was shielded by accompanying countermeasures.
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| 15 |
ID:
174744
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| Publication |
Washington, D C, NCRI, 2018.
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| Description |
133p.pbk
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| Standard Number |
9781944942151
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059913 | 358.17182/NAT 059913 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 16 |
ID:
155561
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| 17 |
ID:
128083
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Israel on Sept. 3 conducted the first flight test of a new missile defense target designed to improve Israeli defenses against longer-range ballistic missiles. The unannounced launch of the target, designed to simulate medium-range ballistic missiles like those possessed by Iran, was detected by Russian radar and reported in Russian media.
Israel, which initially claimed that it was unaware of a missile launch over the Mediterranean Sea after it was reported in the Russian media, said the test of the Silver Sparrow ballistic missile defense target was long planned. The Israeli Ministry of Defense issued a statement on its Facebook page saying that the missile defense radar successfully detected and tracked the launch and transferred flight data to the battle management system.
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| 18 |
ID:
115389
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| Publication |
Surrey, IHS Global Limited, 2012.
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| Description |
503p.
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| Standard Number |
9780710630216
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056834 | 623.4519/LEN 056834 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 19 |
ID:
135733
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| Publication |
Surrey, IHS Jane's, IHS Global Limited, 2014.
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| Description |
xxvi, 434p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
9780710631077
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:1,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058033 | 623.4519/LEN 058033 | Main | On Shelf | Reference books | |
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| 20 |
ID:
149221
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| Publication |
Surrey, IHS Global Limited, 2016.
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| Description |
490p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9780710631916
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058892 | 623.4519/OHA 058892 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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