| Summary/Abstract |
Pakistan’s progress toward full democracy is dependent upon many variables. One major obstacle to establishment of a mature democracy is widespread corruption, which penetrates deep into the institutions of governance and accountability. Three civilian governments (1958–1971, 1977–1988, 1999–2008) have been overthrown by the military, and three (1988–1990, 1991–1993, 1994–1996) removed by elected presidents on charges of ‘public corruption.’ The extensive literature on causes of corruption in Pakistan has focused on the most apparent reasons, which include politicized bureaucracy, weak institutions, and incompetent political classes. No attention has been paid to the role of the National Accountability Ordinance (NAO), a legal framework under which the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) has been operating since November 1999. This study is the first to highlight the NAO’s role in spreading corruption. Rational choice theory and the economics of crime are applied to evaluate Pakistan’s anti-corruption law, particularly the settlement system. The study concludes that flaws in the law in an environment where the NAB lacks institutional autonomy result in the benefits of a crime outweighing the costs for an offender. In other words, awareness of gaps in the law increases corruption.
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