| Summary/Abstract |
After the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th Party Congress was held in the fall of 2012, frequently asked questions were: Is Xi Jinping able to rein in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and what is the state of Chinese party-military relations? What are the implications of this status for the PLA in China’s Taiwan policy-making? What is the potential impact of Taiwan’s leadership transition on China’s Taiwan policy and on the PLA’s role?
This author argues that through a stick and carrot approach, Xi has become the leader of China, and has been able to rein in the PLA. His proactive and assertive approach in the context of China’s growing capabilities has empowered him to control the discourse of Taiwan policy. In these circumstances, the PLA will continue to be one joint actor within the relevant apparatus executing Taiwan policy without its own agenda. Uncertainty as a result of the ruling party rotation in Taiwan is unlikely to change the PLA’s role.
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