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ID:
156329
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Summary/Abstract |
IN JUNE 2016, Eurosceptics won the referendum on the UK's membership in the European Union. In March 2017, UK Prime Minister Theresa May notified Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, that Great Britain intended to leave the EU; this triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. The British government needed nine months to formulate its vision of the future relations with the EU and outline the parameters of withdrawal. British proposals, however, multiplied questions rather than provided answers. The EU leaders, on the other hand, have their own ideas about the conditions, on which the UK will be allowed to quit. The sides' initial positions differ to the extent that the road toward a compromise looks difficult, not to say tortuous.
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2 |
ID:
192961
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Summary/Abstract |
In this article, I argue that identity documents (ID) and migration statuses are both tools of population control and subjectivities that individuals have an interest in holding. I use documentary analyses and interviews with 31 EU27 citizens in the UK, 21 UK citizens in Belgium and the UK and with nationality bureaucracies in the two countries. States create legitimate, illegitimate and in-between statuses, and in-between statuses show how being exempt from certain ID and migration controls can create paradoxical vulnerabilities. Windrush generation migrants in the UK were exempt from migration controls but then in some cases were treated as irregular migrants because of the lack of proof of status. EU citizens were free from many migration controls, but can have difficulties in naturalization and dealing with new requirements brought about by Brexit because the procedures can require proof of rights usually produced through the migration controls they were exempt from.
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