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ID: 156587

Competing interpretations of the stability–instability paradox: the case of the Kargil War / Watterson, Christopher J

Watterson, Christopher J	Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract

The stability–instability paradox is a well-established concept in the nuclear-security literature, which scholars use to explain sub-strategic militarized conflicts between mutually deterred, nuclear-armed adversaries. Despite its ubiquity, there is a confusion in the literature as to the precise causal mechanism underpinning such conflicts. Competing interpretations of the paradox differ in states' perceptions of nuclear escalatory risk as well as whether the balance of military power or the balance of resolve determines outcomes in these sub-strategic conflicts. Testing their respective explanatory powers in a case study of sub-strategic conflict between nuclear powers—the 1999 Kargil War—demonstrates that these two competing models are mutually exclusive.

Key Words

Deterrence ; Kargil ; South Asia ; India ; Pakistan ; Stability–Instability Paradox

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ID: 162681

Nuclear weapons, existential threats, and the stability–instability paradox / Early, Bryan R; Asal, Victor

Asal, Victor	Journal Article
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Recent scholarship has largely ignored systematic differences in the existential threats that nuclear-weapon possessors pose to other states. This study theorizes that the capacity to pose existential threats shapes nuclear-armed states’ willingness to use military force against one another. We explore three hypotheses regarding how nuclear-based existential threats can deter conflict or encourage it, including under the conditions proposed by the stability–instability paradox. We rely on a statistical analysis of nuclear-armed dyads from 1950 to 2001 and employ the Nuclear Annihilation Threat (NAT) Index to capture variation in the existential threats nuclear-armed states pose to one another. We find that being able to pose an existential threat to another state emboldens potential initiators to use military force but does not deter attacks. The emboldening effects are particularly strong under the hypothesized conditions of the stability–instability paradox. Our study provides unique contributions to ongoing debates over the political effects of nuclear weapons.

Key Words

Conflict ; Nuclear Weapons ; Deterrence ; Existential Threats ; Stability–Instability Paradox

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ID: 188935

Strategic Dynamics of Crisis Stability in South Asia / Ali, Iftikhar ; Sidhu, Jatswan S

Iftikhar Ali	Journal Article
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In contrast to the pervasive confidence that the development of nuclear weapons ensures peace and stability by making wars too expensive to fight for, South Asian strategic stability has drifted into nasty security competition through arms race with an episodical crisis that continues at the sub-conventional level. Deterrence studies that were relegated to the bins of history soon after the end of the Cold War received a renewed interest of scholars on the subject since the demonstration of deterrent capabilities by South Asian rivals in 1998. A new wave of deterrence studies has developed in the current multipolar world with some scholars adopting Cold War models of analysis in the contemporary realms of South Asia, whereas other are attempting new analytical approaches. This article aims to offer a fresh look at how to provide a clear concept of strategic stability, how strategic stability is applicable in contemporary South Asia and what the recent crisis between India and Pakistan being interwoven with terrorism tells us about crisis stability between the two countries under the shadows of nuclear weapons.

Key Words

Nuclear Weapons ; Deterrence ; crisis stability ; Strategic Stability ; Stability–Instability Paradox

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