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| 1 |
ID:
155682
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper seeks to answer a simple question: When do regional powers get involved in civil wars? Some civil wars see a significant involvement of regional actors, while others show a remarkable level of isolation. What explains this difference? This research answers this question by looking at two case studies: the Algerian civil war (1991–2002) and the Syrian civil war (2011–up to date). The paper identifies and develops five factors of regional involvement. These are: capabilities, regional dynamics, country’s relevance, regional security issues/containment and domestic–external links. civil wars are today one of the most prominent and deadly forms of conflict, and this paper contributes to understanding the important but understudied issue of regional involvement.
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| 2 |
ID:
155680
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study presents a model in which the innate inability of a government to fully comprehend the ramifications of its actions, herein referred to as the myopia of the government, leads to underinvestment in counterinsurgency measures and examines the nature of exchange of violence between the government and rebels. While the idea that voters’ or a government’s myopia leads to myopic policies is well established in the related literature, surprisingly, it has never been incorporated into conflict studies. As far as we are aware, this is the first ever study that analyzes the effects of a government’s myopia on the exchange and eventual escalation of violence when the rebels are in their trying stages and shows situations in which the two-sided violence could be either strategic substitutes or complements. The results suggest that in case of a foresighted government, the acts of two-sided violence are strategic complements. When the government is myopic, however, the rebels’ use of violence is a strategic substitute for the government’s violence. The trade-off, according to the model, lies in exchanging higher levels of violence for lower chances of revolt.
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| 3 |
ID:
155683
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD’s) accession to power following the 2005 elections in Burundi, governance setbacks were of great concern and constantly criticized throughout the post-wartime. This study contributes to the understanding of how legacies of wartime shape post-war trajectory of a former rebel movement by analysing the relationship between main post-2005 features of CNDD-FDD and some key elements of its history. There is substantial evidence showing that the CNDD-FDD leadership, lacking political will for real changes, has continued during the post-wartime its armed movement practices from the maquis era, leading to the conclusion of a facade transformation of CNDD-FDD rebel movement-to-political party.
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| 4 |
ID:
155679
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| Summary/Abstract |
Most studies on internal armed conflict focus on the dyadic interaction between the state and a rebel group, leaving less attention to inter-group fighting. Addressing this gap in the literature, this study argues that the interplay between economic and political inequality and weak state capacity increases the risk of non-state conflict. An empirical analysis of 178 non-state conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1989 and 2011 provides support for the theorized conditional effect, but only for the role of economic inequality. The effect of political exclusion in the context of a weak state is not confirmed, suggesting that such conditions may be more prone to violence of another kind (i.e., mobilization against the state). Overall, these findings highlight the importance of a functioning state for maintaining peaceful inter-group relations, while they also lend support to earlier research that reports divergent effects of economic and political inequalities on civil conflict risk.
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| 5 |
ID:
155681
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| Summary/Abstract |
While research has already focused on power-sharing agreements by assessing specific effects of political, economic, territorial and military provisions, some provisions might be more important than others. This paper argues that the content of an agreement is crucial for the cohesion of a signatory rebel group since these are strongly affected by resource-distribution and the way in which the underlying conflict is managed. Investigating on the Free Aceh Movement and the Moro National Liberation Front, this study concludes that the implementation of power-sharing is decisive. When inner-core provisions and single factions are addressed, groups tend to stay united.
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